2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey

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Svante E. Cornell and Halil Magnus Karaveli
rationale for supporting the AKP had disappeared. These were instead
increasingly attracted by the neo-nationalism of the opposition Republican
People’s party, the CHP. Most importantly, the AKP had lost its backing in
the U.S, when it failed to deliver support when the incoming U.S.
Administration decided to take action against Iranian nuclear facilities.
Indeed, the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran in 2010 changed the map of the Middle
East. With the replacement of the Iranian theocracy by a secular regime in
an ensuing popular uprising, the perception of Turkish secularism in the U.S.
had changed as well. By then, it had become apparent that “moderate”
Islamism did not serve America’s interests, leading to a re-evaluation in the
U.S. of the secular alternative for the Middle East.
The extended transitional regime brought in by the military took decisive
measures to counter-act the effects of decades of Islamicization.
Significantly, the education system was overhauled. Notably, the expansion
of the imam schools was checked, and secular alternatives to the attractive
schools run by the religious fraternities were created. However, the
suspension of democracy exacerbated ethnic tensions. The Kurdish
population was increasingly tempted by separatism. Gen. Koşaner, who as
new army chief in 2008 had called for giving priority to a military solution to
separatism, responded by the use of force, leading to an intensification of
conflict that further damaged Turkey’s international standing and tested the
unity of the country to its limits, as in the early 1990s. Furthermore, military
authoritarianism had the effect of radicalizing the Islamic movement.
Judging the Likelihood of Scenarios
Attributing degrees of likelihood to the three scenarios mentioned above is
necessarily tentative. The least probable scenario is the third, which appears
at best a possible result of a confluence of negative trends. As for scenario
one, it is fully plausible given the strength and clarity of current trends in
Turkey. Yet a reading of recent history also suggests that the prospect of a
linear development in Turkey is not probable, and that any ruling coalition is
likely to be weakened and replaced within the timeframe envisaged in this
study. That leaves scenario two, which is by far the most optimistic scenario
for Turkey’s future. Again, that scenario may appear to be wishful thinking