2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey
2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey
2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Prospects for a ‘Torn’ <strong>Turkey</strong> 61<br />
membership; while the realization is growing in <strong>Turkey</strong> that EU accession<br />
implies the handover of large portions of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s sovereignty to Brussels, a<br />
prospect decidedly unpopular among both civilian and military circles in<br />
Ankara. Especially in neo-nationalist circles, an increasing and sometimes<br />
paranoid anti-Europeanism parallels the anti-American sentiment.<br />
Both economically and politically, however, <strong>Turkey</strong> has no realistic<br />
alternative to Europe. Ideas are broached periodically of alternative<br />
constellations; the 1990s saw talk of a Turkic Union, and Erbakan’s Islamistled<br />
government proposed a union of Muslim states instead of the EU.<br />
Subsequently, various brands of nationalists have proposed alternative<br />
strategic alliances, sometimes with America and Israel, or with Russia and<br />
Iran. Yet the reality is that <strong>Turkey</strong>’s economy is heavily dependent on<br />
Europe; about half of its imports as well as exports tie it to the EU.<br />
Politically as well, integration with Europe has been an issue that is not only<br />
about foreign policy, but that is in fact primarily about <strong>Turkey</strong>’s identity as<br />
European power.<br />
One of the AKP’s major accomplishments was to shed the anti-European<br />
baggage of the Islamic movement. The AKP continued along the reformpath<br />
laid out by the previous, centrist government, and followed it through.<br />
That said, the AKP’s enthusiasm for European harmonization reforms had<br />
already decreased by the end of 2004. The road ahead for <strong>Turkey</strong>’s relations<br />
with the EU is unclear, given the multitude of developments both in the EU<br />
and in <strong>Turkey</strong> that could derail it. It is safe to conclude that Turkish EU<br />
membership is not a foregone conclusion. While it is one of several possible<br />
end states in the current negotiations, it is entirely plausible to imagine<br />
scenarios whereby either <strong>Turkey</strong> or the EU decide to sever the accession<br />
negotiations, leading eventually to another form of relationship.<br />
Most realistically, both <strong>Turkey</strong> and the EU will spend a good deal of time in<br />
the next half decade coming to terms with their respective internal problems<br />
– the un-governability of the EU, and the likely recurring regime crisis in<br />
<strong>Turkey</strong>. Toward the middle of the next decade, however, the most likely<br />
outcome of Turkish-European relations is probably going to be visible. At<br />
present, the most probable scenario appears to be one whereby <strong>Turkey</strong>, in a<br />
decade, enjoys a continued possibility to move toward EU membership, and a