2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey
2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey
2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey
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24<br />
Svante E. Cornell and Halil Magnus Karaveli<br />
front, nevertheless many observers doubted the authenticity of the claim,<br />
calling it instead a pure Al Qaeda operation.<br />
More consequential perhaps is Turkish Hizbullah, unrelated to its Middle<br />
Eastern namesake. Created with Iranian support in the 1980s, Hizbullah<br />
came to gain strength in the Kurdish areas of <strong>Turkey</strong>, capitalizing on the<br />
dominance of the more orthodox Shafi’i school and the lack of following for<br />
the PKK’s Marxist-Leninist ideology. Indeed, Hizbullah came into violent<br />
confrontation with the PKK in the early 1990s, something that led to<br />
unconfirmed speculations that the Turkish military supported or even<br />
created the group. What is clear is that the military refrained from targeting<br />
Hizbullah until it defeated the PKK following the capture of its leader,<br />
Abdullah Öcalan, and possibly allowed the group to stage training camps<br />
without interference. In 2000-2002, as the group had turned its attention from<br />
the PKK to civilian targets deemed un-Islamic as well as the Turkish state,<br />
the security forces began directly targeting the group and practically<br />
decimated it within a few years. 8 Following this, the group appears to have<br />
replaced its violent campaign with one to seek support among the local<br />
Kurdish population by social program, akin to the Hamas experience.<br />
These two organizations, like smaller radical groups in <strong>Turkey</strong>, stand out by<br />
their foreign linkages. With the possible exception of the Al Qaedaconnected<br />
2003 attacks, neither has been a major force in the 2000s. <strong>Turkey</strong><br />
has hence so far mainly succeeded in keeping violent Islamic extremism<br />
under control. Whether this will continue to be the case depends largely on<br />
the ongoing struggle between secularism and Islam. But barring a major<br />
upheaval that would introduce authoritarian rule repressing expressions of<br />
political Islam, there is little to suggest that the pattern of the past decades<br />
would be reversed. In the unlikely event that a repressive anti-Islamic regime<br />
emerges, however, a conceivable consequence could well be the radicalization<br />
of parts of the Islamic community in <strong>Turkey</strong>.<br />
8 Soner Çağaptay and Emrullah Uslu, ”Hizballah in <strong>Turkey</strong> Revives: Al Qaeda’s<br />
Bridge between Europe and Iraq?” Policy Watch no 946, Washington Institute for Near<br />
East Policy, January 2005.