2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey
2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey
2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey
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Prospects for a ‘Torn’ <strong>Turkey</strong> 51<br />
Still, the principal ground for an eventual, durable reconciliation between the<br />
military and political Islam is provided by the Kurdish question. As has been<br />
elaborated and as indicated by the AKP’s ability to appeal to the Kurds, Islam<br />
may succeed where Kemalist nationalism has failed. Consequently, the<br />
military faces the challenge to reconcile the ideological imperative, securing<br />
secularism, and the territorial imperative, preventing the loss of the Kurdish<br />
south-east. It can hardly be expected to prioritize the former over the latter.<br />
It is however, an altogether different question to what degree an Islamic<br />
conservatism that appeals to the Kurds will remain as attractive for the<br />
Turkish majority. As has been noted, an ethnic Turkish nationalism that<br />
excludes the Kurds is in the process of evolving at a popular level. The fact<br />
that the war waged by the PKK against the Turkish state since 1984 has so far<br />
not ignited ethnic violence across <strong>Turkey</strong>, in the cities in the west, where<br />
Turks and Kurds live side by side, has been a testimony to the basic<br />
solidarity that unites Turkish citizens. It showed that the Turkish majority<br />
did not perceive the conflict as an ethnic one, but rather as a “terrorism”<br />
problem, restricted to the PKK. The attacks of the PKK on Turkish soldiers<br />
did not result in ordinary Kurds being targeted for revenge. But there are<br />
ominous signs. The terrain of the conflict is shifting to the west: The PKK<br />
increasingly recruits among the Kurds in western cities, and hatred against<br />
Kurds is developing among Turks, in particular in the western, Aegean<br />
region, where descendants of Muslim refugees from the Balkans and the<br />
Caucasus make up an important part of the population.<br />
Obviously, there is a risk that PKK terrorism could provoke Turkish<br />
militarism. But General Ilker Başbuğ, Chief of the General staff since August<br />
<strong>2008</strong>, has displayed a conciliatory attitude, stating the importance of seeking<br />
non-military solutions to the problem. As has been noted, a vast majority of<br />
the population, at over 80 percent, opposes military rule. All prior coups, of<br />
1960, 1971, 1980 and the “post-modern” coup in 1997 enjoyed popular<br />
legitimacy. The confrontation of 2007-<strong>2008</strong> underlined that the military no<br />
longer enjoys such legitimacy, that it has lost the ideological high-ground,<br />
that it is not automatically obeyed or welcomed as before, and that its<br />
interventions carry the risk of unseating the status it still enjoys in society.