2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey

Prospects for a ‘Torn’ Turkey
vii
it of a religious or a secularist nature – could succeed. However, Turkey
seems destined to become a more markedly religious and conservative
country, although secularism will not have disappeared as a societal force to
be reckoned with. Presently, religious conservatism undoubtedly has the
upper hand, and the historical trend since the 1950s is on its side. Meanwhile,
it is misleading to describe the Turkish state as having been staunchly
secularist in the past half century. In fact, the state has continuously sought
to accommodate Islam, while secularism, on the other hand, has not been
tended to.
An important conclusion is therefore that the military should not be assumed
to have an unwavering commitment to secularism, even if it is obviously not
insensitive about the issue. However, the military has little choice but to
adjust to a changing societal environment in which religious conservatism is
on the ascendancy. In addition, the Kurdish question provides the ground
for a possible, durable reconciliation between the military and political Islam,
as the latter has proven itself capable of securing the loyalty of a substantial
portion of the religiously conservative Kurdish population. It is however an
altogether different question to what degree an Islamic conservatism that
appeals to the Kurds will remain as attractive for the Turkish majority. An
ethnic Turkish nationalism that excludes the Kurds could be in the process of
evolving at a popular level as a reaction to the PKK’s continued attacks on
the Turkish military and its acts of terrorism.
In the long run, it is unlikely that Islamic conservatism would turn Turkey
into a more Western-oriented nation. Although Turkey will not “break”
with the West strategically, the ties between it and the West are bound to
become weakened. The growing Islamicization of society will inevitably lead
to a concomitant cultural estrangement of Turkey from the West in general,
with possible strategic repercussions. The common ground of shared values
which sustains the special relationship between the U.S. and its European
allies will in that case be increasingly lacking in the U.S.-Turkish
relationship. That will make the relationship, although likely to endure and
not necessarily to cool in strategic terms, more vulnerable to mutual
misunderstandings and tensions.