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2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey

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28<br />

Svante E. Cornell and Halil Magnus Karaveli<br />

and its subsequent globalization. <strong>10</strong> The result has been a proportional decrease<br />

in the power of the secular business elites that are mainly centered in western<br />

<strong>Turkey</strong>.<br />

Yet, economic liberalization has not only translated into a growth of wealth<br />

which has tilted the balance between center and periphery to the detriment of<br />

the former; it has also given rise to income disparities and popular discontent<br />

which in “normal” cases tend to furnish parties of the left with political<br />

opportunities. The absence of a credible left, which was the result of the<br />

havoc brought by the military dictatorship of the 1980s, has instead been<br />

capitalized upon by the Islamic conservatives. The ascendancy of Islam as a<br />

political force thus owes a great deal to the initial political encouragement of<br />

the military, and to a double-edged economic liberalization, which has<br />

strengthened the pious bourgeoisie while at the same time creating<br />

conditions of social discontent which the Islamic conservatives have been<br />

able to capitalize upon in the absence of a credible social democratic left.<br />

Popular Secularism and Conservatism<br />

Observers of <strong>Turkey</strong> in general tend to assume that the Islamic ascendancy<br />

represents the irresistible reclaim by a supposedly essential popular culture,<br />

of a terrain that had been occupied by an alien secularism imposed from<br />

above by the state. Yet the perception of <strong>Turkey</strong> as a country in which a<br />

staunchly secularist state is locked in confrontation with a religiousconservative<br />

population is largely off-mark. It should not be presumed that<br />

secularism is less rooted popularly than what religious conservatism is. The<br />

line dividing <strong>Turkey</strong> over the issue of secularism and the role of religion does<br />

not run between state and society, but rather through both. In fact, the<br />

Turkish state has been much more accommodating towards religion than is<br />

generally acknowledged.<br />

The notion of an excessive and authoritarian secularism provoking a<br />

religious reaction from a people deprived of its culture fails to take the<br />

history of the Turkish republic fully into account. Rather than being<br />

insensitive to religious feelings, successive secular governments have in fact<br />

<strong>10</strong> Stephen Kinzer, Crescent and Star: <strong>Turkey</strong> Between Two Worlds, New York: Farrar,<br />

Strauss, Giroux, 2002, 57-87.

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