2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey
2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey
2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey
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28<br />
Svante E. Cornell and Halil Magnus Karaveli<br />
and its subsequent globalization. <strong>10</strong> The result has been a proportional decrease<br />
in the power of the secular business elites that are mainly centered in western<br />
<strong>Turkey</strong>.<br />
Yet, economic liberalization has not only translated into a growth of wealth<br />
which has tilted the balance between center and periphery to the detriment of<br />
the former; it has also given rise to income disparities and popular discontent<br />
which in “normal” cases tend to furnish parties of the left with political<br />
opportunities. The absence of a credible left, which was the result of the<br />
havoc brought by the military dictatorship of the 1980s, has instead been<br />
capitalized upon by the Islamic conservatives. The ascendancy of Islam as a<br />
political force thus owes a great deal to the initial political encouragement of<br />
the military, and to a double-edged economic liberalization, which has<br />
strengthened the pious bourgeoisie while at the same time creating<br />
conditions of social discontent which the Islamic conservatives have been<br />
able to capitalize upon in the absence of a credible social democratic left.<br />
Popular Secularism and Conservatism<br />
Observers of <strong>Turkey</strong> in general tend to assume that the Islamic ascendancy<br />
represents the irresistible reclaim by a supposedly essential popular culture,<br />
of a terrain that had been occupied by an alien secularism imposed from<br />
above by the state. Yet the perception of <strong>Turkey</strong> as a country in which a<br />
staunchly secularist state is locked in confrontation with a religiousconservative<br />
population is largely off-mark. It should not be presumed that<br />
secularism is less rooted popularly than what religious conservatism is. The<br />
line dividing <strong>Turkey</strong> over the issue of secularism and the role of religion does<br />
not run between state and society, but rather through both. In fact, the<br />
Turkish state has been much more accommodating towards religion than is<br />
generally acknowledged.<br />
The notion of an excessive and authoritarian secularism provoking a<br />
religious reaction from a people deprived of its culture fails to take the<br />
history of the Turkish republic fully into account. Rather than being<br />
insensitive to religious feelings, successive secular governments have in fact<br />
<strong>10</strong> Stephen Kinzer, Crescent and Star: <strong>Turkey</strong> Between Two Worlds, New York: Farrar,<br />
Strauss, Giroux, 2002, 57-87.