2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey
2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey
2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
64<br />
Svante E. Cornell and Halil Magnus Karaveli<br />
that would rewrite the strategic map of the Middle East, the Turkish-Israeli<br />
alignment. This relationship was to strengthen for a decade, bringing great<br />
strategic benefits to both parties, as well as providing <strong>Turkey</strong> with powerful<br />
support in the U.S. domestic lobbying game. Indeed, this alignment was a<br />
key factor enabling <strong>Turkey</strong> to cut Syrian support for the PKK and decimate<br />
the organization.<br />
The AKP’s decidedly different approach to the Middle East did not mean<br />
aloofness. Quite to the contrary, the Middle East has been a chief<br />
preoccupation for the Islamic conservative Islamist government. But rather<br />
than focusing on Israel, the AKP capitalized on its Islamic credentials to<br />
build relationships with the Arab world and Iran that earlier government<br />
could not or would not do. Hence the AKP repaired ties with Syria, and<br />
improved relations with Iran, while seeking to maximize its influence over<br />
Iraq’s future. It has been much less concerned about ties with Israel, while<br />
maintaining a certain cordiality that permitted it to try to mediate between<br />
the Jewish state and its Syrian arch-rival in <strong>2008</strong>.<br />
Reality dictates that <strong>Turkey</strong> will be compelled to have the Middle East as a<br />
key element in any future foreign policy. Iraq and Iran, in particular, will be<br />
issues dominating <strong>Turkey</strong>’s agenda. In Iraq, dealing with the reality of a<br />
Kurdish entity in that country’s North will continue to be Ankara’s main<br />
concern, simply because no other foreign policy issue has comparable<br />
potential ramifications for <strong>Turkey</strong>’s domestic stability. Here, its interest in<br />
maintaining Iraq’s integrity will be shared by the country’s other neighbors,<br />
chiefly Iran. As far as Iran is concerned, Ankara is not thrilled by Tehran’s<br />
radicalism or its nuclear program. Indeed, an Iranian nuclear weapon would<br />
likely raise the prospect of <strong>Turkey</strong> seeking nuclear capability as well. Yet the<br />
AKP appears to believe, perhaps exaggeratedly, that it could play a role in the<br />
diplomatic games on the issue. Tehran, however, is likely to play along<br />
mainly in order to gain time.<br />
Given current trajectories, the likelihood of a regional conflict over Iran’s<br />
nuclear ambitions stands at the top of the list of issues that are likely to affect<br />
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s regional security in the coming decade. Such a conflict would put<br />
immense pressure on <strong>Turkey</strong>, exceeding even that prior to the 2003 Iraq war.<br />
Indeed, <strong>Turkey</strong>’s stance would likely determine the future of its relationship