2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey

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Svante E. Cornell and Halil Magnus Karaveli
“model” for others. This latter tendency is nevertheless often counterproductive,
caricaturing Turkey rather than supporting its strengths – the
concept of a moderate Muslim state, supported by strong forces in the U.S.,
comes to mind. Yet with a population likely to approach 100 million in the
next two decades, with Europe’s strongest conventional military force, and a
booming economy, Turkey has a massive under-utilized potential to function
as a bulwark of stability and positive force for the development of
surrounding regions, be it the Caucasus, the wider Black Sea region, the
Eastern Mediterranean or the Middle East. To some extent, Turkey already
plays this role: it has taken on important duties in peacekeeping and stabilitybuilding
in Afghanistan and the Balkans, and in supporting the development
of post-Soviet states. Yet this potential remains under-utilized; something
that in a sense is understandable, given that few countries have as
challenging a foreign policy environment as Turkey, requiring constant
attention to and expertise about very different regions of the world.
Indeed, this complex reality acts as a break on Turkey’s ambitions. Turkey’s
potential as a regional power is only likely to develop if the country proves
able to resolve the several impediments that continue to mar it. Three chief
issues deserve specific mention.
First, Turkey’s location implies as many challenges as opportunities. Indeed,
the fact of being surrounded by unruly hotspots implies that Turkish foreign
policy can hardly escape a tendency of being reactive rather than proactive.
Sudden unexpected crises force Turkey to act, but prevent it from designing
tenable long-term strategies – just as events tend to rapidly unravel any
strategies designed.
Secondly, consecutive Turkish leaders appear to lack a realistic strategy for
the future of their country’s regional role. The lack of capacity to handle the
many divergent hotspots surrounding the country is apparent; indeed, the
foreign policy establishment continues to lack adequate human and financial
resources to stand up to the challenge. Strongly focused toward the West by
tradition, it has failed to develop sufficient capacities in terms of analysis and
networking in the eastern vectors of the foreign policy to play this role.
Moreover, the Turkish leadership as well as intellectual classes continue to be
marred by a penchant toward conspiracy theories as well as emotionally