2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey

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Svante E. Cornell and Halil Magnus Karaveli
natural for feudal leaders to be courted, primarily by the right-wing parties.
That, in turn, integrated into the power structures ethnically Kurdish
representatives that often played a directly negative effect for the integration
and development of Kurdish-populated regions.
This in turn explains the rise of the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Its
staunch Marxism-Leninism stems precisely from a revolt against the feudal
structure of Kurdish society – indeed, the PKK’s main aim at the outset was
the transformation of Kurdish society, and its main enemy was the feudal
elite. The Turkish state was initially seen as a potential ally in this struggle;
but the PKK rapidly realized that the Turkish state was a force protecting
rather than challenging the status quo. This turned the Turkish state to the
PKK’s target. That process was in turn exacerbated by the collapse of
communism worldwide. The PKK always built on two elements: Kurdish
nationalism and Marxist-Leninist ideology. It was hence natural in the 1990s
to soften the ideological aspect and emphasize Kurdish nationalism.
The ruthlessness of the PKK, coupled with the Turkish state’s response,
essentially forced all political expressions of Kurdishness to choose sides.
Indeed, perhaps seeing the weak appeal of its leftist ideology, the PKK
always saw as one of its main objectives the prevention of the emergence of
alternative political representatives of Kurdishness. This reality survived the
1998 capture and imprisonment of its leader, Abdullah Öcalan. Indeed,
successive Kurdish political parties in Turkey – HADEP, DEHAP, and the
present DTP – all failed to shake off the decisive influence that the PKK and
Öcalan personally has exercised over them. As the PKK refused to give up
terrorism – hence failing to make the transition toward legitimacy undergone
by the PLO and the IRA – it has also continuously failed to achieve one of its
main aims, being recognized by Europe as the legitimate representative of the
Kurds. Moreover, the PKK’s control over the legal Kurdish political parties
has led the latter, also, to refrain from denouncing terrorism and the PKK; as
a result, Europe refuses to accept them as a legitimate interlocutor. Hence,
the PKK and its affiliates continue to dominate Kurdish politics in Turkey,
but fail to be accepted as legitimate internationally. This effectively deprives
Kurdish nationalism of a fully legitimate representative both in Turkey and