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2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey

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66<br />

Svante E. Cornell and Halil Magnus Karaveli<br />

Central Asia is visible in the AKP’s foreign policy. The <strong>2008</strong> war in Georgia,<br />

which elicited only a half-hearted Turkish reaction, is a case in point.<br />

<strong>Turkey</strong> has great potential for economic and political influence in the areas<br />

of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Nevertheless, this remains an<br />

unfulfilled potential largely due to a relative lack of interest on the part of the<br />

current government, perhaps understandable given the multitude of more<br />

prioritized issues such as Europe, Iraq and Cyprus. To that, recent experience<br />

has shown that Turkish policy in the Caspian region is likely to be effective<br />

and influential only if coordinated with the West, primarily but not only in<br />

the energy sphere. By contrast, flirtations with the idea of dealing with<br />

Russia in the region are bound to failure. This is the case simply because<br />

there is little room for <strong>Turkey</strong> in Russia’s plans for the region – which<br />

overtly seek Russian dominance over the South Caucasus – while <strong>Turkey</strong><br />

could play a considerable role in Western strategies.<br />

This reality notwithstanding, the war in Georgia in <strong>2008</strong> showed that<br />

Turkish leaders by no means felt an instinctive reaction to coordinate<br />

policies with the West. In fact, when Prime Minister Erdoğan revived the<br />

moribund idea of a Caucasus Stability Pact (swiftly renamed into a<br />

somewhat less compelling Initiative) in the middle of the war, the proposed<br />

structure would include the three states of the South Caucasus, <strong>Turkey</strong>, and<br />

Russia. Neither Iran nor the EU or the U.S. featured in <strong>Turkey</strong>’s<br />

calculations, in spite of them all being included in earlier proposals for a<br />

stability mechanism for the region; and western spokesmen made it clear that<br />

the initiative had not been discussed with them. Naturally, this raised<br />

eyebrows in western capitals, as it seemed to indicate a submissive reaction<br />

to blatantly aggressive Russian policies, salvaging Turkish interests by<br />

accommodating Moscow. It prompted worries across the South Caucasus<br />

that the AKP government had defected from playing a leading role in<br />

Western policies toward the Caucasus, instead beginning to play second<br />

fiddle to Russia, a role hitherto reserved for Iran.<br />

Russia – Rival and Partner<br />

Turkish-Russian relations have developed greatly since the collapse of the<br />

USSR, becoming a vector in its own right not least because of the huge trade<br />

relationship: <strong>Turkey</strong>’s economic ties with Russia by far outweigh Turkish

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