2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey
2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey
2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey
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66<br />
Svante E. Cornell and Halil Magnus Karaveli<br />
Central Asia is visible in the AKP’s foreign policy. The <strong>2008</strong> war in Georgia,<br />
which elicited only a half-hearted Turkish reaction, is a case in point.<br />
<strong>Turkey</strong> has great potential for economic and political influence in the areas<br />
of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Nevertheless, this remains an<br />
unfulfilled potential largely due to a relative lack of interest on the part of the<br />
current government, perhaps understandable given the multitude of more<br />
prioritized issues such as Europe, Iraq and Cyprus. To that, recent experience<br />
has shown that Turkish policy in the Caspian region is likely to be effective<br />
and influential only if coordinated with the West, primarily but not only in<br />
the energy sphere. By contrast, flirtations with the idea of dealing with<br />
Russia in the region are bound to failure. This is the case simply because<br />
there is little room for <strong>Turkey</strong> in Russia’s plans for the region – which<br />
overtly seek Russian dominance over the South Caucasus – while <strong>Turkey</strong><br />
could play a considerable role in Western strategies.<br />
This reality notwithstanding, the war in Georgia in <strong>2008</strong> showed that<br />
Turkish leaders by no means felt an instinctive reaction to coordinate<br />
policies with the West. In fact, when Prime Minister Erdoğan revived the<br />
moribund idea of a Caucasus Stability Pact (swiftly renamed into a<br />
somewhat less compelling Initiative) in the middle of the war, the proposed<br />
structure would include the three states of the South Caucasus, <strong>Turkey</strong>, and<br />
Russia. Neither Iran nor the EU or the U.S. featured in <strong>Turkey</strong>’s<br />
calculations, in spite of them all being included in earlier proposals for a<br />
stability mechanism for the region; and western spokesmen made it clear that<br />
the initiative had not been discussed with them. Naturally, this raised<br />
eyebrows in western capitals, as it seemed to indicate a submissive reaction<br />
to blatantly aggressive Russian policies, salvaging Turkish interests by<br />
accommodating Moscow. It prompted worries across the South Caucasus<br />
that the AKP government had defected from playing a leading role in<br />
Western policies toward the Caucasus, instead beginning to play second<br />
fiddle to Russia, a role hitherto reserved for Iran.<br />
Russia – Rival and Partner<br />
Turkish-Russian relations have developed greatly since the collapse of the<br />
USSR, becoming a vector in its own right not least because of the huge trade<br />
relationship: <strong>Turkey</strong>’s economic ties with Russia by far outweigh Turkish