2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey

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52 Svante E. Cornell and Halil Magnus Karaveli Indeed, the consciousness that coups in the long run create more problems than they solve, is near-universal, uniting secularists and religious conservatives. Although there were civilian secularists who expected the military to save them from Islamic conservative rule during the confrontation of 2007-2008, the military’s intervention in April 2007 – when an e-memorandum was posted at the website of the General staff, expressing opposition to the election of Abdullah Gül as president – was greeted with incomprehension by secularist opinion-makers in general. Turkey’s experience with military rule is in fact not reassuring from a secularist perspective; in particular the decisive coup of 1980 has had the effect of casting a lasting doubt over the secular trustworthiness of the officer corps. As was noted earlier, it would be surprising if the ascendant religious conservatism of the society was not reflected in military ranks as well. Still, a future, military putsch cannot be excluded; but in that event, it is more likely to be a mutiny outside the chain of command, resembling the coup attempt in Spain in 1981, or the alleged attempted coups in Turkey 2004. However, twenty-first century Turkey is likely to remain as “militaristic” as ever, irrespective of whether it becomes less secular or not. The notion that the Turkish military would cease yielding power – becoming a normal, European military – is unrealistic given the weight of historical heritage and Turkey’s strategic environment. The armed forces can be expected for the foreseeable future to carry significant political clout in matters related to foreign policy and national security, regardless of how Turkey evolves politically in other respects. And nothing suggests that the Islamic conservatives are unprepared to reconcile themselves with that reality. What they have in mind is rather a division of labor, basically leaving the supervision of national security to the military, while expecting it to step back and accept that religion permeates more of the daily life in society. Indeed, such a division of labor would not be entirely new; Islam and the military have in fact always supplied the main foundations of the republican order, religion securing a certain societal cohesion and stability and the military maintaining internal order. The co-existence of two divergent worldviews in society will however inevitably continue to generate friction and furnish Turkish politics with a
Prospects for a ‘Torn’ Turkey 53 defining context for decades to come. Neither religious conservatism nor secularism will be wished away; both are sociologically deeply rooted, and neither can in the short run be expected to prevail altogether over the other. The co-existence of competing value systems, while creating tensions, also signifies that Turkish society is inherently pluralistic, multi-culturally heterogeneous to an extent that it is difficult to envisage that an attempt to establish an authoritarian system – be it of a religious or secularist nature – could succeed. Yet, religious conservatism undoubtedly has the upper hand, and the historical trend – since the 1950s – is definitely on its side. The election victory in 2007 suggested that the AKP was destined to fulfill a function as the dominating party, akin to that of the Swedish social democrats or the German Christian democrats. Just as these parties founded their power on an ability to reach out beyond their traditional core of socialists and religious conservatives, respectively, the Islamic conservatives had largely managed to reconcile the left-right divide of Turkish politics, appealing to voters of a conservative, liberal and social democratic inclination alike. It is however an attraction that depends on a continuously successful managerial record. The Islamic conservatives will at one point inevitably become politically worn out, just as happened to the center-right a decade ago. Corruption, which is as widespread among the AKP cadres as it was during the reign of the center-right, can be expected to tarnish their image. Indeed, the recent unraveling of the extent of corruption has not failed to affect the standing of the AKP in opinion polls. Economic woes are sure to exact their toll, and this is almost certain to happen within the next decade at the latest. That would, in theory, create the opportunity for a return of the center-right that has been the traditionally dominant force of Turkish politics. However, such a return would not amount to any dramatic rupture with long-term societal and ideological trends as the center-right itself has been instrumental in paving the way for a more religiously conservative society. A thoroughly secular liberalism of the European kind has never succeeded in emerging in Turkey. As the AKP to all intents and purposes has become the trustee – although with an obviously stronger tinge of Islam – of the center-
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Page 78 and 79: Conclusions Turkey’s internal and
Page 80: Authors’ Bio Svante E. Cornell is
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