2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey

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74 Svante E. Cornell and Halil Magnus Karaveli rationale for supporting the AKP had disappeared. These were instead increasingly attracted by the neo-nationalism of the opposition Republican People’s party, the CHP. Most importantly, the AKP had lost its backing in the U.S, when it failed to deliver support when the incoming U.S. Administration decided to take action against Iranian nuclear facilities. Indeed, the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran in 2010 changed the map of the Middle East. With the replacement of the Iranian theocracy by a secular regime in an ensuing popular uprising, the perception of Turkish secularism in the U.S. had changed as well. By then, it had become apparent that “moderate” Islamism did not serve America’s interests, leading to a re-evaluation in the U.S. of the secular alternative for the Middle East. The extended transitional regime brought in by the military took decisive measures to counter-act the effects of decades of Islamicization. Significantly, the education system was overhauled. Notably, the expansion of the imam schools was checked, and secular alternatives to the attractive schools run by the religious fraternities were created. However, the suspension of democracy exacerbated ethnic tensions. The Kurdish population was increasingly tempted by separatism. Gen. Koşaner, who as new army chief in 2008 had called for giving priority to a military solution to separatism, responded by the use of force, leading to an intensification of conflict that further damaged Turkey’s international standing and tested the unity of the country to its limits, as in the early 1990s. Furthermore, military authoritarianism had the effect of radicalizing the Islamic movement. Judging the Likelihood of Scenarios Attributing degrees of likelihood to the three scenarios mentioned above is necessarily tentative. The least probable scenario is the third, which appears at best a possible result of a confluence of negative trends. As for scenario one, it is fully plausible given the strength and clarity of current trends in Turkey. Yet a reading of recent history also suggests that the prospect of a linear development in Turkey is not probable, and that any ruling coalition is likely to be weakened and replaced within the timeframe envisaged in this study. That leaves scenario two, which is by far the most optimistic scenario for Turkey’s future. Again, that scenario may appear to be wishful thinking
Prospects for a ‘Torn’ Turkey 75 given the current acrimonies of Turkish politics and the growing “culture wars”, to borrow and American term, in society. In the final analysis, the most likely development for Turkey lies in some form of combination of the event foreseen in scenarios one and two.
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2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey

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