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beyondukraine.euandrussiainsearchofanewrelation

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The Logic of U.S. Engagement 99<br />

directions, while keeping NATO divided on the issue, is a likely<br />

Russian goal. Since the NATO allies have no intention of actually<br />

having Ukraine join NATO, they illogically risked incurring<br />

unnecessary costs by holding on to an ideal of Ukrainian NATO<br />

membership. Worse, they signaled dangerous false promises to the<br />

Ukrainian people.<br />

A preference for spheres of influence and buffer zones in<br />

Ukraine was a clear redline for the Russians, which NATO policy<br />

drove right over with the alliance’s 2008 declaration that Ukraine<br />

and Georgia would eventually become NATO members 17 .<br />

Advocates of the NATO open door for a democratic Ukraine did<br />

so out of an idealist-based moral goal that is laudable. But, as<br />

former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, wrote in his 2014<br />

Memoir Duty:<br />

Getting Gorbachev to acquiesce to a unified Germany as a<br />

member of NATO had been a huge accomplishment. But<br />

moving so quickly after the collapse of the Soviet Union to<br />

incorporate so many of its formerly subjugated states into NATO<br />

was a mistake. Quickly including the Baltic states, Poland,<br />

Czechoslovakia, and Hungary was the right thing to do, but I<br />

believe the process should then have slowed […] Trying to bring<br />

Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was truly overreaching. The<br />

roots of the Russian Empire trace back to Kiev in the ninth<br />

century, so that was an especially monumental provocation.<br />

Were the Europeans, much less the Americans, willing to send<br />

their sons and daughters to defend Ukraine or Georgia? Hardly<br />

[...] NATO expansion was a political act, not a carefully<br />

considered military commitment, thus undermining the purpose<br />

of the alliance and recklessly ignoring what the Russians<br />

considered their own vital national interests 18 .<br />

Meanwhile, the United States had long believed it was important<br />

that the enlargement of the European Union was an additional key<br />

ingredient to order-building alongside NATO. Russia too had<br />

seemingly taken a less assertive tone towards the European Union.<br />

17 “NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration”, 3 April 2008,<br />

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm.<br />

18 R. Gates, Duty, New York, Alfred Knopf, 2014, p. 157.

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