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106 Beyond Ukraine. EU and Russia in Search of a New Relation significant impact on the Russian economy; symbolic but important reassurance of new NATO allies in a way that puts Europeans in the lead; and encouraging European-led diplomacy, in particular that pursued by German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, and French President, Francois Holland. Meanwhile, clear signals were sent to Russia that the West would work with it where it could. Just after terrorist attacks in France in January 2015, NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, said: “That’s the reason why we still strive for a more cooperative and constructive relationship with Russia” – reflecting on the benefits of working with Russia on counter-terrorism 32 . The balance of power overwhelmingly favors the Western alliance and thus restraint and engagement was a strategic advantage relative to the complexity of the Ukraine crisis. The NATO allies collectively spend over $1 trillion a year on defense versus about $80 billion for Russia. Russia made tactical gains in eastern Ukraine – but Moscow was, overall, playing a weak hand. NATO did not need to diminish the prospects for de-escalation of the crisis or discourage some kind of negotiated settlement about Ukraine’s future status 33 . In terms of military actions, the United States and the European allies focused mainly on how to provide low-level, but symbolically important, reassurance to new NATO members nearest to Russia. NATO sustained rotational deployments via exercises into allied countries concerned about Russia. This was done in ways that could be ratcheted up or down depending on Moscow’s behavior. NATO opted against permanent deployments so as not to give Vladimir Putin justification for even more aggression, i.e. via a claim that it was the allies who violated the NATO-Russia Founding Act. NATO’s approach to collective defense has, since it began enlargement in the mid-1990s, made its new members nervous because it is built upon reinforcing a member that is attacked, rather than on forward defense of 32 A. Delfs, “NATO Head Says Russian Anti-Terror Cooperation Important”, Bloomberg News, 8 January 2015. 33 J. Rovner, “Putin’s Crimea Blunder”, The National Interest Online, 6 March 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/putins-crimea-blunder-10006.
The Logic of U.S. Engagement 107 territory. That is not the automatic security guarantee countries like Poland hoped to get on joining NATO. In particular, it requires consensus among all NATO allies to implement any decision to reinforce one of its member states. The allies sought to address this in military terms at a summit meeting in Wales in September 2014. They created a new ‘spearhead’ force that can move rapidly to reinforce an ally in a crisis within forty-eight hours. The force-planning concept was relatively small – just up to 5,000 in total – but, crucially, it was to be all-European in its makeup. The NATO spearhead force for rapid deployment in an Article V scenario is an important development as it does not require American ground forces to implement. There are, nonetheless, significant hurdles in terms of force structure, size, and costs. If one or two key contributing allies do not participate, the entire operational concept could unravel. This spearhead force, meanwhile, was not anticipated to even be deployable until 2016 – and, when available, it would only take one NATO ally to block consensus on its activation. Still, the model of building new force structures without the United States was important. Britain stepped forward early, offering 1,000 operational troops and an additional 3,500 for exercises and pre-deployment of equipment to facilitate its use. Prime Minister David Cameron said at the Wales summit: “No one will leave here with any doubt that our collective security is as strong as it has ever been. The Alliance is firmly committed to providing ongoing reassurance to our eastern Allies” 34 . Nonetheless, sustaining readiness for rapid deployment will be expensive even for such a small grouping. Who else would contribute and pay these costs was unclear when NATO planners met in November 2014 to review progress on the force structure. For example, would non-contributing allies offset the costs of the force? Consequently, an interim force was to be set up including 34 N. Morris, “Ukraine Crisis: NATO Agrees Major Troop Deployment to Guard Against Russian Aggression”, The Independent, 5 September 2014.
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