beyondukraine.euandrussiainsearchofanewrelation

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42 Beyond Ukraine. EU and Russia in Search of a New Relation insisted that Ukraine was an integral part of Russian history and, indeed, of Russia 26 . Although it is doubtful that the subordination to the domestic politics can be considered the main basis of the EU stance towards Ukraine, Kissinger’s demand for more realistic and concrete priorities certainly looks sharable. Conclusion and policy implications For over twenty years Russia and the European Union have had very different and substantially conflicting strategies towards the post-Soviet Eastern Europe and South Caucasus countries. The European vision of its own non-aggressive expansion eastwards is not shared by Moscow, while Europe does not accept the Russian will to maintain some form of control over the post-Soviet territories. The different assessment of the ‘color revolutions’, the contrast on the missile installations in Eastern Europe, the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008, the opposing political project regarding post-Soviet states gradually strengthened a sharp contrast that exploded at the end of 2013 in Ukraine. Despite the growing economic interdependence, the EU and Russia have not so far been able to find lasting forms of political understanding based on the real acceptance of differences in interests and values. The competition for the post-Soviet space represents the most serious threat to the further development of the partnership between Brussels and Moscow, which is of paramount importance to both. As a matter of fact the severity of the Ukraine crisis imposes a profound rethinking of the relationship between the EU and Russia. The future of the post-Soviet countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus should be defined with a much more shared involvement of all the interested actors. In particular, the EU 26 “Henry Kissinger: To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end”, The Washington Post, 5 March 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisisstart-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html.
EU-Russia: What Went Wrong? 43 should take a deep reflection on its strategy towards the Eastern Partnership and consider more carefully the consequences of some delicate political decisions. In the post-Soviet countries the weight of history and the determination of Russia to defend its interests must be seriously taken into account. On the other hand, despite the strategic relevance of the acquisition of the Crimea and the high internal consensus, Russia should feel strongly motivated to get out of this situation of political isolation and progressive economic decline. As a matter of fact Moscow needs to recover and expand its partnership with Europe and the West. The Eastern alternative is in fact dangerous for the Russians, no less than for us. Therefore, however hard it may seem, the European political project and the Russian one must be complementary, not opposed. For the good of the involved countries, but also for the recovery and consolidation of the Russian-European strategic relations.
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