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62 Beyond Ukraine. EU and Russia in Search of a New Relation in April 2015, despite persisting strategic differences, Russia continues to share with the West a number of fundamental interests, ranging from the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to fighting organized crime and terrorism, and tackling poverty 40 . Whereas the descent into a new Cold War could prove particularly costly for Moscow, the West could gain by acknowledging that there might be some substance to Russian grievances 41 ; while Ukraine’s association agreement with the EU was one of the triggers of the current crisis, Germany, in light of its role in the inception of the post-Cold War settlement and its influence within the bloc of 28, has gradually taken centre stage, making it clear that it will not ship arms to Kiev 42 . Berlin’s problem, however, is that it does not appear to have a comprehensive solution to bring the crisis to an end, while the structure of the EU’s common security and defense policy is no help 43 . Having deep-seated interests in ending the conflict, preserving Ukraine’s territorial integrity and restoring meaningful cooperation with Moscow, Germany and other members of the European Union should lobby with the United States and their Eastern European partners to adopt a policy that recognizes Russia’s security interests and minority rights, while upholding the territorial integrity of Ukraine and other former Soviet republics. As negotiations with Iran have recently proved, good relations with Russia are essential for the West to deal with a number of pressing issues, including the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, an increasing terrorist threat, and eventually with the rise of China’s political and military prowess. While in the current scenario the assumption of any significant role by the EU – for example through a joint EU-Russian crisis management operation in Eastern Ukraine with the participation of OSCE 40 http://www.russianews.net/index.php/sid/232073445. 41 M.E. Sarotte (2009). 42 S. Braun, “Waffen für Kiew? Merkel ist ‘da sehr zweifelnd’”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 7 February 2015, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/muenchner-sicherheitskonferenz-waffen-fuer-kiew-merkel-istda-sehr-zweifelnd-1.2340946. 43 See J.J. Mearsheimer, “Don’t Arm Ukraine”, The New York Times, 8 February 2015.
After Maidan: Re-Starting NATO-Russia Relations 63 observers – remains a remote prospect, a renewed NATO engagement with the Kremlin in the spirit of the 1967 Harmel Report, providing a balanced mix of deterrence and strategic reassurances for Moscow, might offer a first breakthrough 44 . Conclusion This chapter has argued that the crisis between the alliance and Russia that was triggered by the Euromaidan revolt marks the latest episode of a progressive deterioration in relations, whose origin can be found in the volatile nature of the East-West settlement which brought the Cold War to an end. With the agreements of 1989-1990 failing to clarify the former Soviet space’s collocation in the new European security architecture, NATO has incorporated the Baltic States and maintained an open door policy towards Georgia and Ukraine, while Moscow has sought a coordinated revision of the current Pan-European order, endeavoring to win the West’s recognition of Russia’s sphere of special interests and to establish a new security belt along its frontiers. Since the inviolability of national borders is a fundamental pillar of a Europe that is ‘whole and free’, the West should rediscover the mantra of the 1967 Harmel Report, remaining vigilant about Russian moves but also endeavoring to engage the Kremlin in talks about a clarification of the former Soviet space’s collocation within the current European security structure. While, as Polish President, Bronislaw Komorowski, remarked in a speech to the Ukrainian Rada in April, there might not be a stable Europe without a free Ukraine 45 ; there will certainly not be a secure continent without a comprehensive reconciliation with Russia. 44 The text of the Harmel Report is available at http://www.nato.int/ cps/en/natolive/80991.htm. 45 See the official website of the President of the Republic of Poland, http://www.president.pl/en/news/news/art,808,poland-extends-its-hand-to-ukraine.html.
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