beyondukraine.euandrussiainsearchofanewrelation

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80 Beyond Ukraine. EU and Russia in Search of a New Relation economic benefits, accession to the Eurasian Union will also help countries integrate into Europe sooner and from a stronger position 1 . A better understanding of the potential positive outcomes of this geopolitical and geo-economic dynamic is not only analytically relevant, but could also help European countries and Russia to elaborate more effective strategies to develop a more cooperative relationship both among themselves and with other countries of the region. Obstacles on the way to Greater Europe For over 20 years the idea of building a Greater Europe has been a significant landmark along the way to cooperation in the Euro- Atlantic region. However, its concrete fulfillment faces at least three fundamental problems. The first one concerns security issues. How best to resolve the ‘security dilemma’ between Russia and NATO, as well as that between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community as a whole? How to build a common security space? The answers to these questions require solving a whole bunch of problems, including the enlargement of NATO, ways to settle local conflicts, control over nuclear and conventional weapons, the missile defense issue and many others. The second one is of an economic kind. It pertains to the measures to be taken to align the economic potential of the EU, Russia, and the post-Soviet states. These are key to achieving a mutually interdependent economy in Greater Europe as well as to creating a common humanitarian space with the participation of Russia and other post-Soviet states. The third one relates to the post-Soviet space itself and deals with reconciliation of Russia’s strategic interests in the post-Soviet 1 Article by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin “A new integration project for Eurasia: The future in the making”, Izvestia, 3 October 2011, http://www.russianmission.eu/en/news/article-prime-minister-vladimir-putin-newintegration-project-eurasia-future-making-izvestia-3-.
Seen from Moscow: Greater Europe at Risk 81 space with EU and NATO enlargement plans as well as the sovereign choices of certain post-communist countries. The end of the Cold War brought down the curtain on bloc confrontation. Nevertheless, it did not guarantee the solution of the aforesaid problems. On the contrary, the collapse of the Soviet Union has seriously exacerbated them. For twenty years we have seen a consistent narrowing of the window of opportunity to address these issues. The narrowness of this window became apparent by the late 2000s, even before the Ukrainian crisis and the stagnation of Russia’s relations with both NATO and the EU. Success stories have been few and far between, and their cumulative effect could not deliver a qualitative breakthrough. Indeed, virtually no issues in the security sphere have been solved. NATO’s consistent enlargement ignored Russia’s concern, at least as it is viewed from Moscow. Initiatives in the field of conventional arms control have reached deadlock. Local conflicts have not been settled by joint effort and, at best, they currently remain frozen. The strategic stability system is worsening (missile defense, prompt global strike initiatives, etc.) and nuclear deterrence remains the key guarantor of security (at least, for Russia). Indeed, post-Soviet states have become an arena for competition, rather than cooperation. The situation in the economic and humanitarian spheres is better, but progress in this area has also largely been exhausted. Therefore, it is true that economic and humanitarian integration achieved certain results, but it has generally failed to deliver. This has been due to EU enlargement, the problem of multi-speed European integration and asymmetrical economic cooperation. Finally, energy cooperation seems politicized (i.e. 3 rd Energy Package, transit routes). At the same time, the fundamental issue of harmonizing post- Soviet states’ integration plans has not been resolved. The post- Soviet space has become an arena of cutting the ties that bind along new dividing lines. In most cases, it has involved a clear-cut choice between Western and nominal Russian projects. Institutions and formats that could harmonize these processes have
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