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beyondukraine.euandrussiainsearchofanewrelation

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106 Beyond Ukraine. EU and Russia in Search of a New Relation<br />

significant impact on the Russian economy; symbolic but<br />

important reassurance of new NATO allies in a way that puts<br />

Europeans in the lead; and encouraging European-led diplomacy,<br />

in particular that pursued by German Chancellor, Angela Merkel,<br />

and French President, Francois Holland.<br />

Meanwhile, clear signals were sent to Russia that the West<br />

would work with it where it could. Just after terrorist attacks in<br />

France in January 2015, NATO Secretary General, Jens<br />

Stoltenberg, said: “That’s the reason why we still strive for a more<br />

cooperative and constructive relationship with Russia” – reflecting<br />

on the benefits of working with Russia on counter-terrorism 32 . The<br />

balance of power overwhelmingly favors the Western alliance and<br />

thus restraint and engagement was a strategic advantage relative to<br />

the complexity of the Ukraine crisis. The NATO allies collectively<br />

spend over $1 trillion a year on defense versus about $80 billion<br />

for Russia. Russia made tactical gains in eastern Ukraine – but<br />

Moscow was, overall, playing a weak hand. NATO did not need to<br />

diminish the prospects for de-escalation of the crisis or discourage<br />

some kind of negotiated settlement about Ukraine’s future status 33 .<br />

In terms of military actions, the United States and the European<br />

allies focused mainly on how to provide low-level, but<br />

symbolically important, reassurance to new NATO members<br />

nearest to Russia. NATO sustained rotational deployments via<br />

exercises into allied countries concerned about Russia. This was<br />

done in ways that could be ratcheted up or down depending on<br />

Moscow’s behavior. NATO opted against permanent deployments<br />

so as not to give Vladimir Putin justification for even more<br />

aggression, i.e. via a claim that it was the allies who violated the<br />

NATO-Russia Founding Act. NATO’s approach to collective<br />

defense has, since it began enlargement in the mid-1990s, made its<br />

new members nervous because it is built upon reinforcing a<br />

member that is attacked, rather than on forward defense of<br />

32 A. Delfs, “NATO Head Says Russian Anti-Terror Cooperation Important”,<br />

Bloomberg News, 8 January 2015.<br />

33 J. Rovner, “Putin’s Crimea Blunder”, The National Interest Online, 6 March 2014,<br />

http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/putins-crimea-blunder-10006.

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