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102 Beyond Ukraine. EU and Russia in Search of a New Relation apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense”. Gates added that some allies are “apparently willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the growing security burden left by reductions in European defense budgets” 23 . These problems of European dependence on American power projection were especially pronounced in areas of enabling forces (transport, intelligence, command and control, etc.) for even relatively small operations, like the French-led incursion into Mali. Meanwhile, European contributions became more and more limited – from robust engagement in the Balkan conflicts to just a handful of countries in the Libyan war in 2011. This dependence was especially problematic given America’s strategic plans to pivot to Asia. The Asia pivot requires America to reduce its military footprint in other regions while Asia remains steady or growing in American diplomatic, trade, and military considerations. Given the capacity of allies in Europe to invest in their own defense needs, this pivot requires the Persian Gulf to be the second major emphasis, and Europe would be third among major priorities for important American geopolitical considerations. Meanwhile, fiscal realities also require the United States to liberate costly overseas military deployments so as to invest in the domestic foundations of power. There is acute uncertainty among the new NATO allies closer to Russia who are nervous about the viability of NATO’s collective defense commitments. Secretary of State, John Kerry, said in April 2014 that: “ […] together we have to make it absolutely clear to the Kremlin that NATO territory is inviolable. We will defend every single piece of it […] Article V of the NATO treaty must mean something, and our allies on the frontline need and deserve no less” 24 . This statement was a re-interpretation both of the NATO treaty and existing NATO defense plans. The 23 T. Shanker, “Defense Secretary Warns NATO of ‘Dim Future’”, New York Times, 10 June 2011. 24 D. Brunnstrom, “Kerry: NATO Territory Inviolable”, Reuters, 29 April 2014.
The Logic of U.S. Engagement 103 NATO treaty is worth re-reading because it is frequently interpreted well beyond what Article V actually says: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area 25 . This language was intentionally left ambiguous to ensure flexibility, promising only to consider an attack on one as an attack on all, and consultation over how best to respond 26 . Credibly in the Cold War this was achieved with large forward deployed ground forces and nuclear weapons. Today, the promise is based on reinforcement of a threatened ally, which would depend on all NATO members agreeing to implement. This raises understandable concerns about whether NATO processes could inhibit reinforcement of a threatened ally. As the Polish Prime Minister said in August 2008, regarding reluctance in NATO to back Georgia against Russia: “Poland and the Poles do not want to be in alliances in which assistance comes at some point later – it is no good when assistance comes to dead people” 27 . At the same time, for many European allies, the problems of Ukraine – even the Baltics – are a distant worry. Italy, for example, was expected to gain 200,000 immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East in 2015. In April 2015, columnist Jim Hoagland spelled out the dilemma for NATO. He cited a long-time Italian NATO hand saying, a week after 900 North African refugees drowned trying to 25 “The North Atlantic Treaty”, Washington, D.C., 4 April 1949. 26 See L.S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance, Boston, MA, Twaynes Publishers, 1994. 27 T. Shanker, N. Kulish, “Russia Lashes Out on Missile Deal”, New York Times, 15 August 2008.
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