beyondukraine.euandrussiainsearchofanewrelation

The Logic of U.S. Engagement 101
welfare for the rich” 20 . Nevertheless, the United States has, at the
same time, been unwilling to change the incentive basis for
European investment in defense and broader strategic engagement.
When taken together, the European members of NATO have
two nuclear powers and over 2 million people collectively in
uniform. Still, while the U.S. was spending 31 per cent of its
defense budget on capability investments, the European allies
spent a combined 22 per cent. Most European defense spending
was national and not coordinated to allow for specialization and
thus lower costs 21 . In 2013, for example, France sent 2,400 ground
troops in an intervention into the African country Mali to combat
radical Islamic militias with links to al-Qaeda. The French force
was small – but the remaining total collective European
contribution was just 450 troops – and limited to a post-crisis
training mission. France could not sustain the operation alone and
had to turn to Washington to provide enabling forces. The absence
of European capability underscored growing costs to the United
States even when an ally tried to lead. For example, the C-17
cargo plane, which the U.S. contributed to move French troops
and equipment cost about $225 million per plane to procure. This
cost the U.S. about $4.5 billion in terms of new planes and
existing maintenance of procurements and about $12,000 per hour
to fly. Personnel costs run about $385,000 per service member
associated with each plane – which grow higher with training
costs for pilots and do not account for retirement and other
associated long-term benefits 22 .
Former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, had warned in
2011 that NATO faced a “dim, if not dismal future” and that
“there will be a dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S.
Congress – and in the American body politic writ large – to
expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are
20 B. Posen, “Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs,
vol. 92, no. 1, January/February 2013, p. 121.
21 J. Dempsey, “How Much Are Americans Willing to Spend to Defend Europe”,
International Herald Tribune, 7 January 2013.
22 This data is compiled by P. Carter, “The French Connection”, Foreign Policy, 23
January 2013.