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Seen from Moscow: Greater Europe at Risk 81
space with EU and NATO enlargement plans as well as the
sovereign choices of certain post-communist countries.
The end of the Cold War brought down the curtain on bloc
confrontation. Nevertheless, it did not guarantee the solution of the
aforesaid problems. On the contrary, the collapse of the Soviet
Union has seriously exacerbated them. For twenty years we have
seen a consistent narrowing of the window of opportunity to
address these issues. The narrowness of this window became
apparent by the late 2000s, even before the Ukrainian crisis and
the stagnation of Russia’s relations with both NATO and the EU.
Success stories have been few and far between, and their
cumulative effect could not deliver a qualitative breakthrough.
Indeed, virtually no issues in the security sphere have been
solved. NATO’s consistent enlargement ignored Russia’s concern,
at least as it is viewed from Moscow. Initiatives in the field of
conventional arms control have reached deadlock. Local conflicts
have not been settled by joint effort and, at best, they currently
remain frozen. The strategic stability system is worsening (missile
defense, prompt global strike initiatives, etc.) and nuclear
deterrence remains the key guarantor of security (at least, for
Russia). Indeed, post-Soviet states have become an arena for
competition, rather than cooperation.
The situation in the economic and humanitarian spheres is
better, but progress in this area has also largely been exhausted.
Therefore, it is true that economic and humanitarian integration
achieved certain results, but it has generally failed to deliver. This
has been due to EU enlargement, the problem of multi-speed
European integration and asymmetrical economic cooperation.
Finally, energy cooperation seems politicized (i.e. 3 rd Energy
Package, transit routes).
At the same time, the fundamental issue of harmonizing post-
Soviet states’ integration plans has not been resolved. The post-
Soviet space has become an arena of cutting the ties that bind
along new dividing lines. In most cases, it has involved a clear-cut
choice between Western and nominal Russian projects.
Institutions and formats that could harmonize these processes have