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56 Beyond Ukraine. EU and Russia in Search of a New Relation intervene militarily in former Soviet republics to settle, with military force if necessary, territorial and ethnic disputes, keep oil and gas pipelines running, and continue “the civilizing role of Russia on the Eurasian continent” 26 . The war against Georgia exposed the NRC’s limits; the alliance reacted by establishing a NATO-Georgia Commission, de facto suspending the NRC, endorsing the signing of a bilateral U.S.-Polish missile agreement, relocating a U.S. Patriot missile battery from Germany to Poland, and starting defense planning for the Baltic States. Nonetheless, with the United States bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq and with France and Germany lacking any appetite for a military confrontation, the West proved incapable of deterring Russian action or of effective intervention. While making a firm point that further eastern encroachment by NATO and the EU would be resisted, Moscow complained that its request to discuss Georgian ‘aggression’ at the NRC had been obstructed by the alliance, undermining the Council’s very purpose 27 . In the same year, the Kremlin announced an ‘active response’ to the Bush administration’s revival of missile defense, warning that Russia might target European components of the planned shield and deploy nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad 28 . Faced with the worst deterioration in relations since the Cold War, after taking office in January 2009 the Obama administration promised a ‘reset’ in relations, resuming diplomatic contacts and limited cooperation with Moscow. In early 2009 Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, agreed with President Obama and then Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, to work together on a number of issues, such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation and Afghanistan; informal meetings of the NRC were also resumed. The most notable achievements of the Democratic administration’s attempt to 26 D. Trenin, “Pirouettes and Priorities: Distilling a Putin Doctrine”, The National Interest, no. 74, Winter, 2003/2004, pp. 76-83; see also V. Frolov, “A new Post- Soviet Doctrine”, The Moscow Times, 20 May 2005. 27 J. Kulhanek, “Russia’s uncertain rapprochement with NATO”, The RUSI Journal, vol. 156, no. 1, 2011, p. 41. 28 L. Ratti (2009), p. 415.
After Maidan: Re-Starting NATO-Russia Relations 57 engage Moscow were a revitalization of the NRC, then Russian President Vladimir Medvedev’s attendance at the alliance’s 2010 Lisbon summit, and the inclusion in NATO’s new Strategic Concept of a section on relations with Russia 29 . Nonetheless, even the ‘reset’ turned out to be an inadequate remedy that could not revive an institution that had been decisively undermined by the conflicting strategic priorities of its most powerful members; as such, it represented another missed opportunity for a clarification of the former Soviet space’s collocation in the post-Cold War European order. While bringing about a number of results in lowprofile areas, such as Russia’s ratification of the Status of Forces Agreement, which paved the way for joint military exercises on Russian territory, and the inauguration of the Cooperative Airspace Initiative, which brought together Russia and NATO to pool air traffic data to combat air-based terrorism, the ‘reset’ failed to assuage the Kremlin’s grievances that the current architecture marginalizes Russia and produces a bifurcation of security on the continent. Whereas Washington confirmed its determination to pursue missile defense, criticized Russian plans to establish permanent military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and condemned measures taken by the Kremlin to quell domestic opposition, Moscow continued to campaign for the establishment of an ‘all inclusive’ Pan-European security – from Vancouver to Vladivostok or Helsinki Plus – architecture, to prevent any further alliance enlargement, and to seek the West’s implicit acceptance of the post-Soviet space as an area of ‘privileged interests’, as proven by Medvedev’s 2008 proposal for a new Pan-European security treaty that would limit troop deployments in Eastern Europe, and by successive requests for the establishment of a formal dialogue between NATO and the Russian-engineered Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 30 . While the 29 At Lisbon, Russian officials reiterated an interest in carrying out a joint review of common security challenges, acknowledging the need for shared initiatives on Afghanistan, terrorism, piracy, weapons of mass destruction, and natural and manmade disasters. J. Kulhanek (2011), p. 43. 30 Medvedev’s proposal, which was advanced at the World Policy Forum in Evian in October 2008, is available at the following web site:
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