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112 Beyond Ukraine. EU and Russia in Search of a New Relation essential for the EU – and the whole West – to deal with many pressing issues, including the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, the increasing terrorist threat, and eventually with a rise of the political and military prowess of China. Russia and the European Union have various and good reasons to enhance their cooperation, starting from Ukraine. Besides, establishing effective Euro-Russian cooperation on Ukraine may let the United States focus on the issues more relevant to its own security and economic interests. Against this background, some policy recommendations may be conveyed to the EU. Indeed, most of them may equally apply to Moscow too despite its deeply different political stance. The time is ripe to reset Eastern Partnership In order to build a new and more solid relationship with Moscow, the European Union should adopt a consistent and largely innovative policy matching its own interests with Russia’s security interests, while upholding the independence of Ukraine and other former Soviet republics. No matter how well-founded the Russian argument is, the EU cannot help but acknowledge that Moscow perceives the EaP as an antagonistic partnership. This preliminary acknowledgement is key because, from the Russian viewpoint, the eastwards expansion of the EU is nothing but a Trojan Horse for NATO enlargement. This holds true also when it comes to other Western countries. As Sean Key puts it in chapter 6 “looking ahead, the United States and its allies will likely need to make a tough choice to revoke their promise of Ukrainian membership in NATO as there is not likely any solution to the crisis that includes that outcome”. The first necessary step to reset the relationship between Brussels and Moscow is – as much as possible – a search for all possible links between the EU’s project of political integration of post-Soviet countries with Russia’s. Unfortunately, there has been no serious and systemic dialogue between the two sides for almost twenty-five years. The establishment of a frank discussion on this
Conclusions. What Policy Actions for the EU? 113 issue would help rebuild at least some level of trust. In a nutshell, as Luca Ratti maintains in chapter 3 “… there will certainly not be a secure continent without a comprehensive reconciliation with Russia”. Such a comprehensive reconciliation must inevitably take into account the historical sensitivity of Eastern European countries towards Russia – with special attention to Poland’s, as highlighted by Stepan Bielanski in chapter 4 – but without jeopardizing the necessary strategic cooperation with Moscow. In the last two years, indeed, a kind of unofficial coalition including not only Poland and the Baltic States, but also Russoskeptics in Britain, Sweden, and other countries has influenced the EU’s attitude toward Russia. However Germany too, and consequently other states of “Old Europe”, have taken a tougher stance vis à vis Moscow. A more balanced approach is probably needed to support the EU’s economic and strategic interests. On the other hand, despite the strategic importance of acquiring the Crimea and great domestic support for it, Putin too should feel strongly motivated to get out of today’s trap of political isolation and the progressive economic decline of his country. One should note that this economic decline does not primarily stem from the Western sanctions or the recent fall of oil prices. Russia’s economy is overly dependent on exports of raw materials and still awaits deep structural reform. It is vital for Moscow to restart and invest in the partnership with Europe and the West, also with the view to modernizing its economy. Clearly, the current crisis between Russia and the West has wide-ranging geopolitical implications. Faced with political and economic pressures from the US and the EU, Russia is increasingly tilting towards China. However, as the balance of power between China and Russia continues to shift in favor of the former, Moscow risks becoming a junior partner of Beijing. A deep and long-term alienation from Russia may turn out to be dangerous for both the US and the EU. Indeed, Sino-Russian economic integration and political alignment may force the EU to
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