beyondukraine.euandrussiainsearchofanewrelation

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82 Beyond Ukraine. EU and Russia in Search of a New Relation failed to materialize. The principle of new states’ sovereignty, which is undoubtedly correct from a formal standpoint, has de facto ignored the great number of obvious and hidden problems in post-Soviet states, including economic development, good governance, ethnic divisions, and open and latent conflicts. Formal sovereignty came under heavy pressure from internal problems and increased competition from major players. All these problems had emerged before early 2014. However, the situation in Ukraine has led to their dramatic and cumulative aggravation. For the first time in 25 years, a local crisis in one country has shattered the whole system of relations between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community. What remains to be lost The tragedy is that even the theoretical options to solve at least some of the above-mentioned issues risk being quickly and irreversibly extinguished. There is a rapid radicalization of relations, which affects even those areas where cooperation seemed to be at hand. A year and a half ago the window of opportunity was narrow, but at least it was open. Now it seems to be closed indefinitely. In this regard, it is worthwhile highlighting some of the problems and missed opportunities in key fields. Security Europe and Russia should work together on reducing the risks of a nuclear conflict. In the short and medium terms increasing nuclear deterrence, information transparency, confidence-building measures are unlikely to see any positive development. In the worst-case scenario, a number of basic agreements will be reduced to nothing. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty (INF) is particularly at risk. One of the most alarming tendencies is the construction of a direct and formal connection between the conflict over Ukraine and the INF. This has never been a problem
Seen from Moscow: Greater Europe at Risk 83 before. There has been an on-going discussion between Russia and the U.S. on implementation of the treaty, but the INF itself has been treated as a separate track. It has not been correlated with other issues. However the U.S. Ukraine Freedom Support Act establishes such a link (section 10 of the Act). The danger is that Russia may be subjected to sanctions if it is suspected of violating the treaty. The mechanism of sanctions is not clearly stated in the Act in regard to INF. But the very spirit of the Act and the fact that INF has become a part of Ukrainian affairs is a matter of tremendous concern. This may undermine the treaty, which has been a fundamental achievement in Russia-West relations. Consequently, it will make Europe much less secure, promoting the arms race in a very sensitive sphere. In particular, the dialogue on missile defense should be continued. Worsening relations with Russia could trigger the deployment of missile defenses in Europe as well as Russia’s response to neutralize the potential threat to its nuclear forces. If earlier the parties managed to find a compromise, now the situation may result in an arms race, and the absence of any interaction. There is a risk that missile defense will be approached as a means to contain Russia. This justifies Russia’s old fears and suspicions about the ‘real aims’ of the program and undermines trust, which is already close to zero. Tentative ideas on joint institutions to manage and operate missile defense as a measure of trust will hardly get back on the agenda in the foreseeable future. Russia and NATO relations represent another crucial issue. Institutional mechanisms are phased out. The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) raised many questions and aroused censure. But it left open the possibility to exchange views and coordinate positions. This platform is now frozen indefinitely. Meanwhile, this could be a mechanism to reduce the risk of a political escalation, caused by unintended accidents between Russia and NATO arms forces. At the same time the dialogue on Conventional Forces in Europe is mired in deadlock. In the short and mid-term perspective, we are likely to witness a conventional arms race and
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Beyond Ukraine. EU and Russia in Se
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Introduction During the last 15 yea
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