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108 Beyond Ukraine. EU and Russia in Search of a New Relation contributions from Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway 35 . Considerable work remains to fill the collective gaps so that the United States could facilitate European-only operations in the future. There was a new urgency to this rebalancing brought on by the Ukraine crisis because if the United States had to rush forces towards a much more strategically significant challenge in Asia, and Europe was unable to stand alone, a greater crisis might ensue. Conclusion. Towards a new transatlantic architecture Rather than force a rethink of major strategic priorities, like the Asia pivot, the United States has responded effectively to the Russia crisis by not playing into Moscow’s narrative and putting capable allies in the diplomatic, economic, and military lead. The United States has coordinated transatlantic consensus to apply painful political and economic costs on Russia without putting at risk cooperation on areas of mutual interest. It has creatively backed Germany and France as they took diplomatic leads in negotiating a significant cease-fire in Ukraine in early 2015. Working with its allies, it has developed within NATO an European-led spearhead response force, while also offering symbolic rotational exercises to demonstrate its commitment to reassure allies nearest to Russia. It has also worked to anchor the vital transatlantic relationship with Europe by investing in ongoing negotiations over a U.S.-EU trade deal. The United States has done this while sustaining its pivot towards Asia. Looking ahead, the United States and its allies will likely need to make a tough choice to revoke their promise of Ukrainian membership in NATO as there is not likely any solution to the crisis that includes that outcome. Additionally, the United States and its European allies must now make a direct and sustained commitment to work together to better consolidate and pool European capabilities. America’s European allies can provide the main tripwire forces for 35 See S. Fidler, “NATO Struggles to Muster ‘Spearhead’ Force to Counter Russia”, Wall Street Journal, 1 December 2014.
The Logic of U.S. Engagement 109 collective defense operations and can have plans and capacity to project pooled military capabilities to conduct a Balkans or Libyastyle peace enforcement operation without (or supported by) the United States. If the transatlantic burdensharing relationship is successfully realigned, then the United States will be positioned to lead the transatlantic relationship into a durable and lasting architecture for the 21 st century.
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