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26 Beyond Ukraine. EU and Russia in Search of a New Relation and economic power in the hands of the state and, in the last instance, in the hands of just one person and his inner circle. Putin’s government has spawned a de-institutionalisation of the system which will end up undermining the country’s ability to act within the complex structures of globalisation. Putin’s era presents a discouraging balance: capitalism monopolized by a state that is not required to be accountable, institutions in name only – Justice in particular –, omnipresent corruption and a virtually feudal relationship between the ruler and the ruled. President Putin may now be at the acme of his popularity but how long will he be able to maintain this new national mobilization against the West if living standards deteriorate further? What chances for coexistence The EU engaging Russia through cooperation with the Eurasian Union (as Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard suggest 15 ) could be one good option, provided that the latter actually delivers and that internal conflicts among partners do not disrupt their integration process. Yet the chances for this to work out would be much stronger if Russia’s main concern were actually grounded on economic development interests. But now, after Ukraine, this has to be proven and in the very first place to its own partners who have made evident that they are very sensitive about their own sovereignty, regardless of their similarities as political regimes. The Eurasian Union project has been seriously weakened not only by the loss of Ukraine, but by the fears that Russian military intervention has raised in the other two key members, Belarus and Kazakhstan. According to the idea launched by Putin in October 2011, the project was inspired by other regional integration processes such as the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or the Association of Southeast Asian 15 I. Krastev, M. Leonard, The New European Disorder, European Council for Foreign Affairs, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR117_TheNewEuropeanDisorder_ESSAY.pdf.
The EU and Russia after Crimea: Is Ukraine the Knot? 27 Nations (ASEAN) and aspired to be “an essential part of Greater Europe united by shared values of freedom, democracy, and market laws” 16 . However, in the light of the war in Ukraine, it has acquired a neo-imperialist, ethnic dimension that provokes uncertainty and a barely concealed fear in the other members. This largely explains the growing reluctance of Minsk and Astana to further deepen the process of integration and their rejection of any step that could include a political dimension. There is very serious concern in Minsk and Kazakhstan about the Kremlin’s policy regarding territorial integrity and the use of the russkiy mir idea. Moreover it casts doubt on the validity of the formally recognised borders (1994 Memorandum of Budapest 17 ). It is probably not by chance that the Belarussian president Lukashenko was not present at the main military parade in Moscow last 9 May. Domestic political strategy, i.e. regime preservation, is the decisive factor for Putin’s decisions – not rational choice, be it economic or security driven. While the nature of power in the Kremlin remains unchanged, the European Union must seriously revise its strategy towards Russia. What if a conflict arises between Belarus and Russia? What Dmitri Trenin wrote more than ten years ago still fully applies: “Russia’s rapprochement with Europe is only in the second instance a foreign policy exercise. Its success or failure will primarily depend on the pace and depth of Russia’s economic, political and societal transformation. Russia’s ‘entry into Europe’ cannot be negotiated with Brussels. It has to be first ‘made in Russia’ itself” 18 . This will happen in the long run but this perspective should never be abandoned. 16 Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, “A new integration project for Eurasia: The future in the making”, Izvestia, 3 October 2011, http://www.russianmission.eu/en/news/articleprime-minister-vladimir-putin-new-integration-project-eurasia-future-making-izvestia-3-. 17 UN Document A/49/765, Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/49/765. 18 D. Trenin, A Russia within-Europe: Working towards a New Security Arrangement, CEPS ESF Working Paper, no. 6, March 2002, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital- Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=22252.
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