beyondukraine.euandrussiainsearchofanewrelation

The Logic of U.S. Engagement 103
NATO treaty is worth re-reading because it is frequently
interpreted well beyond what Article V actually says:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack
against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of
the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties
so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with
the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the
use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic area 25 .
This language was intentionally left ambiguous to ensure
flexibility, promising only to consider an attack on one as an
attack on all, and consultation over how best to respond 26 .
Credibly in the Cold War this was achieved with large forward
deployed ground forces and nuclear weapons. Today, the promise
is based on reinforcement of a threatened ally, which would
depend on all NATO members agreeing to implement. This raises
understandable concerns about whether NATO processes could
inhibit reinforcement of a threatened ally. As the Polish Prime
Minister said in August 2008, regarding reluctance in NATO to
back Georgia against Russia: “Poland and the Poles do not want to
be in alliances in which assistance comes at some point later – it is
no good when assistance comes to dead people” 27 . At the same
time, for many European allies, the problems of Ukraine – even
the Baltics – are a distant worry. Italy, for example, was expected
to gain 200,000 immigrants from North Africa and the Middle
East in 2015. In April 2015, columnist Jim Hoagland spelled out
the dilemma for NATO. He cited a long-time Italian NATO hand
saying, a week after 900 North African refugees drowned trying to
25 “The North Atlantic Treaty”, Washington, D.C., 4 April 1949.
26 See L.S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance, Boston, MA,
Twaynes Publishers, 1994.
27 T. Shanker, N. Kulish, “Russia Lashes Out on Missile Deal”, New York Times, 15
August 2008.