Corporate Governance and Access to Finance - ESBG

More documents

Recommendations

Info

This stakeholder approach becomes even more complex as morestakeholders interests’ need to be taken into account. For the purposesof this report, the diversity of ownership structures of WSBI members– including listed companies, public banks, semi-public banks, postal savingsinstitutions, foundations, cooperatives or mutual banks –, introduces avery wide range of stakeholders to whom the institution needs to beaccountable. From this point of view, the current emphasis of CorporateGovernance practices on stakeholders’ interests, which will requiresignificant changes in traditional private banks, fits very well in the typicalapproach of WSBI members. In short, the Corporate Governance modelof the financial sector is converging towards the WSBI members’ model.A wider set of interests makes the governance of the institutions morecomplex and mechanisms of participation, voice or exit, should be providedaccording to the Hansmann (1995) terminology. Table A.1 shows anumber of bank goals and the stakeholder’s interests that fit for many ofthe WSBI typology of members (savings banks).Table A.1.Stakeholders' goals in the savings banks activityMission/ goals Description StakeholdersUniversal access to Favor popular savings and Foundersfinancial services credit avoiding the exclusion Public Administrationsfrom the financial system MutualistsProfit maximization Collect savings and make Shareholdersinvestments under safe Depositorsand profitable terms SupervisorEmployeesPromote competition and Efficiency Foundersprevent monopoly abusePublic AdministrationsMake a contribution to Provide services of not-for- Founderssocial welfare and profit and charitable naturewealth distributionMake a contribution to Take notice of the genuine Public Administrationsregional or national interests of the territory/developmentcountrySource: adapted from Cestona and Surroca (2008).100
The table captures the essence of savings banks, that pursue at the sametime returns to their balance sheet and returns to the society. They contributeto the improvement of living conditions, regional development andenhanced competition in the banking marketplace.Two of the abovementioned goals are crucial for the purpose of thisstudy: promoting access to financial services and profit maximization.Empirical findings show that the broadening of their outreach by savingsbanks does not have a cost in terms of lower profitability (see WSBIPerspectives 52, 2006, for a review). The lack of systematic variation inprofitability as outreach increases is a key element to understand thatsavings banks or WSBI members more generally can achieve goals formultiple stakeholders, including shareholders when they exist, depositors,the public sector or members of a mutual society in its case.The traditional approachAccording to traditional studies, the main recommendations forCorporate Governance in firms in general apply also to bankinginstitutions, as documented by La Porta et al (2002), namely that betterresults are obtained in countries where there are mechanisms to ensureprotection of minority shareholders. Caprio et al (2007), however, arguethat the monitoring by small shareholders could be difficult in the caseof banks, even under strong shareholder protection regimes, due tothe opaque nature of their activity, the lack of information on specificborrowers and their inherent liquidity vulnerability. Their findings, though,do not differ from those of non banking firms: controlling owners withlarge cash-flow rights and strong shareholder protection make bankingfirms more valuable. These empirical findings are resulting from a datasetwith the 10 largest publicly listed banks across 44 countries. It is notpossible to derive direct implications for banking firms with no explicitowners, like mutual societies, or with a complex structure of cash flowrights, as many savings banks. For a review of Corporate Governancepractices in the case of mutual societies see Llewellyn (2007).Government intervention promoting high disclosure standards andmarket discipline is one of the main tools to combat the opacity offinancial institutions. Bank transparency would enhance market disciplineand counteract uncertainty. Transparency would also reduce moralhazard, exacerbated by the government guarantees on bank liabilities, asthe current crisis has shown.101
Page 6 and 7:
BoxesBox 1. German Sparkassen 27Box
Page 9 and 10:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARYBackground and obj
Page 11 and 12:
nnAccess to Finance in enshrined in
Page 13 and 14:
Chart A.Corporate Governance, Acces
Page 15 and 16:
nThe study also shows that Corporat
Page 17 and 18:
1. INTRODUCTION1.1. Focus and objec
Page 19 and 20:
WSBI members are by definition acco
Page 21 and 22:
For the particular case of developi
Page 23 and 24:
2. THE LINK BETWEENCORPORATE GOVERN
Page 25:
Table 2. Main features of the Missi
Page 28 and 29:
Access to financeSparkassen promote
Page 30 and 31:
All these examples illustrate how p
Page 32 and 33:
In the case of Peru, the profits th
Page 34 and 35:
Among the WSBI institutions that re
Page 36 and 37:
BOX 2. KENYA POST OFFICE SAVINGS BA
Page 38 and 39:
The fact that the banking system is
Page 41 and 42:
3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE -CONCEPTUAL
Page 43 and 44:
Figure 2. Sound Governance of Finan
Page 45 and 46:
As can be seen in the figure above,
Page 47 and 48:
nnnAt the same time, the distance a
Page 49 and 50: The first two elements (the ownersh
Page 51 and 52: nHowever, this does not mean denyin
Page 53 and 54: Cooperatives are similar to mutuals
Page 55 and 56: 3.4. FoundationsFoundations do not
Page 57 and 58: 3.5. Good Corporate Governance prac
Page 59 and 60: F. DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCYPrinc
Page 61 and 62: 4. ACCESS TO FINANCE -CONCEPTUAL FR
Page 63 and 64: 4.1. Financial deepening and improv
Page 65 and 66: The board does not have any executi
Page 67 and 68: In other words, sustainable financi
Page 69 and 70: The following table shows how the W
Page 71 and 72: The fourth dimension refers to the
Page 73: Table 8. Access to Finance in the f
Page 76 and 77: Only 27 members established in 21 c
Page 78 and 79: nnDCI (Depth of credit information
Page 80 and 81: 5.2. Corporate Governance and Acces
Page 82 and 83: 5.2.1. Corporate Governance and Ave
Page 84 and 85: Chart 8.Specific Corporate Governan
Page 86 and 87: 5.2.2. Corporate Governance and Ave
Page 88 and 89: Chart 13. Corporate Governance comp
Page 90 and 91: Chart 16. Corporate Governance Inde
Page 92 and 93: Chart 19. Specific Corporate Govern
Page 95 and 96: ANNEX 1: REVIEW OFTHE LITERATUREThe
Page 97 and 98: Even among the relatively narrow un
Page 99: Figure A.1. Structure of agents' re
Page 103 and 104: A case study built by Clarke et al
Page 105 and 106: A very recent contribution to the d
Page 107 and 108: For example, in Latin America, WSBI
Page 109 and 110: The paper examines whether a poor e
Page 111 and 112: For the survival of microfinance in
Page 113 and 114: ANNEX 2: CASE STUDIES 32CASE STUDY
Page 115 and 116: It is one of the major characterist
Page 117 and 118: Although Sparkassen are legally and
Page 119 and 120: Figure A.2. Corporate Loans Market
Page 121 and 122: Financial education is also an impo
Page 123 and 124: Corporate GovernanceKPOSB is wholly
Page 125 and 126: Among the initiatives that the gove
Page 127 and 128: Related to the concession of credit
Page 129 and 130: OPERATIONS1. Deposit Base: It was p
Page 131 and 132: Corporate GovernanceThe Central Ban
Page 133 and 134: To address the problem of capital,
Page 135 and 136: Financial inclusion ranges very hig
Page 137 and 138: CASE STUDY 4:SPANISH SAVINGS BANKS
Page 139 and 140: The uniform financial regulation of
Page 141 and 142: Figure A.3. Governing Bodies - Span
Page 143 and 144: The web-based tool www.rededucacion
Page 145 and 146: On the liability side, CMAC offer m
Page 147 and 148: A specificity of CMAC is that the m
Page 149 and 150: Table A.3.MissionMissionCMAC AREQUI
Page 151 and 152:
As of September of 2009, the twelve
Page 153 and 154:
Furthermore, the consensus culture
Page 155 and 156:
ANNEX 3: QUESTIONNAIREQUESTIONI. Ge
Page 157 and 158:
ANNEX 4:THE HONOHAN INDEX 43COMPOSI
Page 159 and 160:
COMPOSITE MEASURE OF ACCESS TO FINA
Page 161 and 162:
ANNEX 5:QUANTITATIVE RESULTSCountry
Page 163 and 164:
Overall Corporate Governance IndexO
Page 165 and 166:
REFERENCES- Andrianova, S., Demetri
Page 167 and 168:
- FSD Kenya (2009), Financial Secto
Page 169 and 170:
- World Bank (2006) The Role of Pos
Page 172:
WSBI - ESBG - The Global Voice of S
show all

Corporate Governance and Access to Finance - ESBG

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?