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Corporate Governance and Access to Finance - ESBG

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The table captures the essence of savings banks, that pursue at the sametime returns <strong>to</strong> their balance sheet <strong>and</strong> returns <strong>to</strong> the society. They contribute<strong>to</strong> the improvement of living conditions, regional development <strong>and</strong>enhanced competition in the banking marketplace.Two of the abovementioned goals are crucial for the purpose of thisstudy: promoting access <strong>to</strong> financial services <strong>and</strong> profit maximization.Empirical findings show that the broadening of their outreach by savingsbanks does not have a cost in terms of lower profitability (see WSBIPerspectives 52, 2006, for a review). The lack of systematic variation inprofitability as outreach increases is a key element <strong>to</strong> underst<strong>and</strong> thatsavings banks or WSBI members more generally can achieve goals formultiple stakeholders, including shareholders when they exist, deposi<strong>to</strong>rs,the public sec<strong>to</strong>r or members of a mutual society in its case.The traditional approachAccording <strong>to</strong> traditional studies, the main recommendations for<strong>Corporate</strong> <strong>Governance</strong> in firms in general apply also <strong>to</strong> bankinginstitutions, as documented by La Porta et al (2002), namely that betterresults are obtained in countries where there are mechanisms <strong>to</strong> ensureprotection of minority shareholders. Caprio et al (2007), however, arguethat the moni<strong>to</strong>ring by small shareholders could be difficult in the caseof banks, even under strong shareholder protection regimes, due <strong>to</strong>the opaque nature of their activity, the lack of information on specificborrowers <strong>and</strong> their inherent liquidity vulnerability. Their findings, though,do not differ from those of non banking firms: controlling owners withlarge cash-flow rights <strong>and</strong> strong shareholder protection make bankingfirms more valuable. These empirical findings are resulting from a datasetwith the 10 largest publicly listed banks across 44 countries. It is notpossible <strong>to</strong> derive direct implications for banking firms with no explici<strong>to</strong>wners, like mutual societies, or with a complex structure of cash flowrights, as many savings banks. For a review of <strong>Corporate</strong> <strong>Governance</strong>practices in the case of mutual societies see Llewellyn (2007).Government intervention promoting high disclosure st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong>market discipline is one of the main <strong>to</strong>ols <strong>to</strong> combat the opacity offinancial institutions. Bank transparency would enhance market discipline<strong>and</strong> counteract uncertainty. Transparency would also reduce moralhazard, exacerbated by the government guarantees on bank liabilities, asthe current crisis has shown.101

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