To build the necessary trust with potential users of financial servicesis a key element <strong>to</strong> succeed on the financial inclusion objective.An “adequate” corporate behavior over time, under realistic conditionsof repeated interaction with borrowers in a community, builds areputation that consolidates the necessary trust or “social capital”.Dowla (2009) analyzes the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, concluding thatits success is based on building trust, building “social capital”, beingcredible through a conveniently trained staff, with a flexible decisionmaking system, training programs <strong>and</strong> related activities that becomemechanisms <strong>to</strong> effectively promote high rates of loans repayment.The spillover has an effect on the system, thus implying that other banksor credit institutions can benefit from a generalized trust environment.This “social capital” can be achieved through a set of <strong>Corporate</strong><strong>Governance</strong> practices at several levels: branch office, institution,community or the whole country.Variables used <strong>to</strong> assess <strong>Corporate</strong> <strong>Governance</strong> <strong>and</strong><strong>Access</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Finance</strong>, <strong>and</strong> their linkComparing <strong>Corporate</strong> <strong>Governance</strong> practices among banks from differentcountries, according <strong>to</strong> the abovementioned findings, should includecountry institutional <strong>and</strong> market conditions. Mersl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Strøm (2008a)specify external governance mechanisms which include product marketcompetition <strong>and</strong> regulation. The idea is that some kind of substitutioneffect among external <strong>and</strong> internal governance mechanisms exists.They suggest a set of variables <strong>to</strong> measure external fac<strong>to</strong>rs, related <strong>to</strong>market competition, banking regulation for savings banks ormicrofinance institutions, consumer education, deposit insurance <strong>and</strong> theavailability of information <strong>to</strong> moni<strong>to</strong>r bank manager’s actions.Internal governance mechanisms refer <strong>to</strong> the stakeholders-boardrelationship, a particular case being the objective of aligning the interestsof board executives <strong>and</strong> owners. Bohren <strong>and</strong> Strom, (2005) refer <strong>to</strong>additional aspects such as: the separation between the CEO <strong>and</strong> theChairman, gender issues, the existence of internal audi<strong>to</strong>r or internalauditing committees <strong>and</strong> educational background or origin of direc<strong>to</strong>rs.Comparing several types of bank ownership structures can explaindifferences in governance practices. Crespí, García-Ces<strong>to</strong>na, <strong>and</strong> Salas (2004)analyze <strong>Corporate</strong> <strong>Governance</strong> in Spanish savings banks compared withcommercial banks during the period 1986-2000.108
The paper examines whether a poor economic performance triggersinternal or external governance interventions (e.g., direc<strong>to</strong>r turnover,chairman or CEO removal or mergers <strong>and</strong> takeovers) <strong>and</strong> find that savingsbanks exhibit weaker internal mechanisms of control than commercialbanks <strong>and</strong> that the only significant relation between performance <strong>and</strong>governance intervention at savings banks is found in case of mergers.The variables used in these governance practices include the following:the types of owners/stakeholders governing the bank <strong>and</strong> their relevance;the relevance of state institutions in the board or their influence in thebank decision process; the accountability of managers <strong>and</strong> direc<strong>to</strong>rs;the existence of nominating committees; the executives dismissalpractices, especially in case of poor performance; the transparency on thedirec<strong>to</strong>rs remuneration <strong>and</strong> the transparency in reporting commercialactivities among direc<strong>to</strong>rs, relatives <strong>and</strong> the bank. Also for Spanishsavings banks, Cuñat <strong>and</strong> Garicano (2009) conclude that those whosechairman was previously a political appointee, did not have postgraduateeducation <strong>and</strong>/or no banking experience had significantly worseloan performance (higher bad loans).Another str<strong>and</strong> of literature relevant for this report is related <strong>to</strong> how <strong>to</strong>measure <strong>Access</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Finance</strong>. Perotti <strong>and</strong> Claessens (2007) differentiate inthis regard between access <strong>and</strong> usage of financial services. <strong>Access</strong> is theavailability of financial services at a “reasonable cost” <strong>and</strong> usage concernsthe actual consumption of services. Although their focus is on the effec<strong>to</strong>f barriers erected by insiders based on the inequality distribution ofpolitical influence, our goal is <strong>to</strong> link the diverse sets of <strong>Corporate</strong><strong>Governance</strong> practices in banking institutions <strong>to</strong> the access <strong>and</strong> usage offinancial services. An empirical paper by Beck et al (2007) measuresfinancial sec<strong>to</strong>r outreach focusing on the “access <strong>to</strong>” <strong>and</strong> “use of”banking services across countries. Their measure of outreach of thefinancial sec<strong>to</strong>r in terms of access <strong>to</strong> banks’ physical outlets is based onthe following indica<strong>to</strong>rs:1. Geographic branch penetration: number of bank branches per 1,000 km 2 .2. Demographic branch penetration: number of bank branches per100,000 people.3. Geographic ATM penetration: number of bank ATMs per 1,000 km 2 .4. Demographic ATM penetration: number of bank ATMs per 100,000people.109
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BoxesBox 1. German Sparkassen 27Box
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYBackground and obj
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nnAccess to Finance in enshrined in
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Chart A.Corporate Governance, Acces
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nThe study also shows that Corporat
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1. INTRODUCTION1.1. Focus and objec
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WSBI members are by definition acco
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For the particular case of developi
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2. THE LINK BETWEENCORPORATE GOVERN
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Table 2. Main features of the Missi
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Access to financeSparkassen promote
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All these examples illustrate how p
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In the case of Peru, the profits th
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Among the WSBI institutions that re
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BOX 2. KENYA POST OFFICE SAVINGS BA
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The fact that the banking system is
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3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE -CONCEPTUAL
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Figure 2. Sound Governance of Finan
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As can be seen in the figure above,
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nnnAt the same time, the distance a
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The first two elements (the ownersh
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nHowever, this does not mean denyin
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Cooperatives are similar to mutuals
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3.4. FoundationsFoundations do not
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COMPOSITE MEASURE OF ACCESS TO FINA
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ANNEX 5:QUANTITATIVE RESULTSCountry
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Overall Corporate Governance IndexO
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REFERENCES- Andrianova, S., Demetri
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- FSD Kenya (2009), Financial Secto
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- World Bank (2006) The Role of Pos
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WSBI - ESBG - The Global Voice of S