3.2. Public banksPublic banks are of special interest, given their relative importance inthe WSBI membership: they represent 57 percent of WSBI members, <strong>and</strong>55 percent of their assets. The BCBS (2006 <strong>and</strong> 2010b) subjects them <strong>to</strong>the same general principles of sound governance as the ones that apply<strong>to</strong> any other bank, because the Committee believes that state-ownedbanks may face many of the same risks associated with weak <strong>Corporate</strong><strong>Governance</strong> than private banks (paragraph 19 of BCBS, 2010). Therefore,the Basel Committee concludes that “the general principles of soundcorporate governance should also be applied <strong>to</strong> state-owned or statesupportedbanks, including when such support is temporary (eg duringthe financial crisis that began in mid-2007, national governments <strong>and</strong>/orcentral banks in some cases provided capital support <strong>to</strong> banks)” 12 .This does not preclude the possibility <strong>to</strong> determine explicit soundgovernance principles for government-owned entities, as described byOECD (2005) for public companies in general. The BCBS documents(2006 <strong>and</strong> the 2010b) also note three specific principles relevant forgovernment-owned banks, which are:nnIn this type of bank a potential conflict of interest could take placeif it is both owned by <strong>and</strong> subject <strong>to</strong> banking supervision by a stateinstitution. Should this be the case, then there must be a fulladministrative separation of the ownership <strong>and</strong> banking supervisionfunctions <strong>to</strong> minimize political interference in the supervision activities(paragraph 59, Principle 3 of BCBS, 2010). Under a sound regula<strong>to</strong>ryframework, the role of the supervisor is essential in this regard.For instance, in the case of BancoEstado (Chile), a government-ownedbank member of WSBI, “the risks of political interference are partiallymitigated by a rigorous prudential supervision by the Chilean bankingsupervisor”, as stressed by Rudolph (2009).Governments should not participate in the daily management ofpublic banks, but respect the independence of the board. The lattermust maintain its responsibilities outside political influences that couldlead <strong>to</strong> conflicts of interest (for example, when direc<strong>to</strong>rs explicitlyrepresent political interests or are public officials).12 Most public banks considered in this section are state-owned institutions, with theimportant exception of the German Sparkassen, where the Municipality is the “Traeger” –a German term that can be translated as “supporting or responsible institution” –, but notthe owner. See Annex 2.50
nHowever, this does not mean denying the right of the government asan owner <strong>to</strong> set the bank’s overall objectives (paragraph 20, Principle1 of BCBS, 2006).Where a bank is state-owned, disclosure policy should include “anownership policy that defines the overall objectives of state ownership,the state’s role in the <strong>Corporate</strong> <strong>Governance</strong> of the bank, <strong>and</strong> how itwill implement its ownership policy” (paragraph 50, Principle 7 ofBCBS, 2006). It is important in this regard <strong>to</strong> stress the need for a cleardefinition of the mission <strong>and</strong> objectives of public banks.Amongst government-owned banks, postal savings institutions are animportant category of WSBI members, especially in Africa. A number ofthem are currently facing institutional reform with a view <strong>to</strong> turn themin<strong>to</strong> proficient <strong>and</strong> competitive financial institutions, acting as keyintermediaries for financial inclusion, across the country. A crucialcondition <strong>to</strong> reach this objective is the development of efficient <strong>and</strong>transparent mechanisms, which will ensure full independence of themanagement <strong>and</strong> Board of Direc<strong>to</strong>rs from political influence.The government's influence over the banking system is not confined <strong>to</strong>ownership. As mentioned above, it has a significant influence throughregulation, <strong>and</strong> can also have an impact by adopting other controls orconditions, such as the establishment of m<strong>and</strong>a<strong>to</strong>ry ratios <strong>and</strong>/ or limits onoperations, either <strong>to</strong> their amount or the prices (e.g. interest rate ceilings).The influence of the state in the banking system is not only a question ofsound governance, but also one of efficiency. Thus, it is necessary <strong>to</strong>avoid any sort of undue influence that may cause a deterioration of theefficiency (<strong>and</strong> therefore the long term stability) of the financial system,such as (i) an unfair competitive advantage for public-owned banks,(ii) a bias in the financing <strong>to</strong>wards the public sec<strong>to</strong>r, (iii) the provisionof liquidity <strong>to</strong> the public sec<strong>to</strong>r in privileged terms or (iv) the lack ofindependence of the board of direc<strong>to</strong>rs <strong>and</strong>/ or the management ofpublic banks. In the particular case of Postal Banks, “it is crucial <strong>to</strong> put inplace efficient <strong>and</strong> transparent mechanisms which will ensure fullindependence of the management <strong>and</strong> Board of Direc<strong>to</strong>rs of the postalsavings institution from political influence <strong>and</strong> clear supervision rules <strong>and</strong>responsibilities” (WSBI, 2010).51
- Page 6 and 7: BoxesBox 1. German Sparkassen 27Box
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The table captures the essence of s
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A case study built by Clarke et al
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A very recent contribution to the d
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For example, in Latin America, WSBI
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The paper examines whether a poor e
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For the survival of microfinance in
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ANNEX 2: CASE STUDIES 32CASE STUDY
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It is one of the major characterist
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Although Sparkassen are legally and
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Figure A.2. Corporate Loans Market
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Financial education is also an impo
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Corporate GovernanceKPOSB is wholly
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Among the initiatives that the gove
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Related to the concession of credit
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OPERATIONS1. Deposit Base: It was p
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Corporate GovernanceThe Central Ban
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To address the problem of capital,
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Financial inclusion ranges very hig
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CASE STUDY 4:SPANISH SAVINGS BANKS
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The uniform financial regulation of
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Figure A.3. Governing Bodies - Span
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The web-based tool www.rededucacion
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On the liability side, CMAC offer m
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A specificity of CMAC is that the m
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Table A.3.MissionMissionCMAC AREQUI
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As of September of 2009, the twelve
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Furthermore, the consensus culture
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ANNEX 3: QUESTIONNAIREQUESTIONI. Ge
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ANNEX 4:THE HONOHAN INDEX 43COMPOSI
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COMPOSITE MEASURE OF ACCESS TO FINA
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ANNEX 5:QUANTITATIVE RESULTSCountry
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Overall Corporate Governance IndexO
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REFERENCES- Andrianova, S., Demetri
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- FSD Kenya (2009), Financial Secto
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- World Bank (2006) The Role of Pos
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WSBI - ESBG - The Global Voice of S