The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology - Konrad Lorenz Institute

Evolutionary Ethicswere validated, I take it that this would be a harsh—though perhaps not fatal—criticism of that aspect ofKANTIAN ethics (at least from the point of view ofanyone who wants to propose useful moral rules).3.2 Emotional predispositionsNext, let us look at the emotional dispositions withwhich our evolutionary past has left us. Since‘ought’ implies ‘can’, it would seem foolish to havea moral rule which demanded behaviours of whichwe were emotionally (or otherwise) incapable, ornearly so. A case in point: all available evidencepoints to a general human predisposition to givepreferential treatment to friends and family. 9 Notonly is this tendency apparently universal amonghuman cultures, it also shows up (under the title‘kin altruism’) in a large number of animal species.Flying in the face of this apparently universalhuman tendency is the Benthamite claim that“each is to count for one and none for more thanone”. This Utilitarian standard requires preciselythat my brother not count for more than a strangerin my moral deliberations. I submit that if we wantour moral rules to be respected and adhered to, theyat least ought not to demand that we forgo stronglyingrained behaviours unnecessarily.It may be objected that humans display all sortsof nasty predispositions that ought not to be excusedsimply because they are ‘natural’. I agree, and notsimply because I want to avoid committing the naturalisticfallacy. For example, regardless of how ingrainedour tendencies toward aggression are, weneed to place moral restrictions on aggressive behaviour.Yet in the case both of aggression and of favouritism,the crucial point is to limit socially destructivebehaviour. Thus, while our sense of justicedemands that we limit favouritism in cases such asthe awarding of government contracts, there will bemany situations in which preferential treatment offamily and friends seems not just forgivable, but appropriate.Likewise, while it is socially imperative toprohibit the killing of innocents, it seems unnecessaryto forbid certain other displays of aggression, forexample organized sports.Further, consider the fact that there may be anumber of moral rules that could mediate any givensocial situation. For example, we might determinesuitable patterns of economic distribution in one ofthree ways:1) by assigning to each individual the right tosome level of quality of life (i.e., a form of Deontology);2) by claiming that a certain pattern of distributionmaximized the net benefits to society as a whole(i.e., Utilitarianism); or3) by claiming that a certain pattern of distributionwould be agreed to in a (hypothetical) fair bargainingsituation (i.e., Contractarianism).Each of these rules is in some sense plausible, andeach might even point to a similar outcome. So instrumentally,it might not much matter which onewe choose. I suggest that if one of them turns out tobe psychologically implausible, this can help uschoose among these competing moral standards.4. Game Theory and Social ConventionsWhat can we say, from an evolutionary perspective,about the particular rules that will work well asmoral rules? The evolutionary perspective leads usto be interested in the function of moral rules; ourfocus should be on determining how different ruleswill function within a social milieu. Game theorycomprises a set of tools that can be used to study,from a theoretical point of view, the social mechanismsof morality. We can usefully think of a moralrule as a strategy for solving a particular social-coordinationproblem. Game theory, as the study of strategicdecision–making, 10 can illuminate moralsituations by reducing them to their basic strategicform. From this perspective, game theory can actuallyserve two important functions with regard tomoral theory.4.1 The function of moralityFirst, we can use game theory to illuminate thefunction(s) of morality. For example, GAUTHIER(1986) uses game theory to argue that morality is asolution to problems of strategic interaction such asthe Prisoner’s Dilemma. Economist Ken BINMORE(1994) argues that morality is a device for choosingamong various stable equilibria in multi-persongames. (A game is said to be in equilibrium wheneach player’s choice of strategies is the best responseto her opponent’s choice of strategies.)An example may help to illustrate this point.Imagine a game in which our goal is to agree upon asocial contract (in the non-technical sense), whichinvolves negotiating a set of rules for us to live by.We can reduce this problem to its strategic essenceby representing it in simplified form as a game. Letus look at the following 2–person game, where x, y,and z are possible actions that each of us could take.If we think of this game as representing negotiationEvolution and Cognition ❘ 101 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1