The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology - Konrad Lorenz Institute

Evolutionary Ethicsdifferent—much more turbulent—outcome. 13Where conventions exist to regulate behaviour thataffects others in significant ways, those conventionsmay be thought of as ‘moral’ conventions, and willbe seen as having significant moral force.Note also that implicit in the definition of a conventionis the fact that any given convention will bebut one of several possible ones for that situation. 14That is, a convention is not a regularity of behaviourstrongly determined either by human nature or theenvironment. But neither (contrary to one commonusage of the term) are conventions entirely arbitrary.Some norms may be arbitrary, but conventionsnever are. As defined here, a convention is sustainedin part by an interest in coordination: thus conventionsalways serve some useful purpose. GAUTHIER,for one, agrees with this strengthening of the term.GAUTHIER (1977, pp333–334) writes that “…to supposethat what is conventional must therefore bearbitrary is entirely contrary to the spirit of contractarianism,which finds only in convention a sufficientrationale for society”. Further, “[t]o considersociety arbitrary is to suppose that it affords no sufficientfulfilment or meets no fundamental need ofmost or all of its members”. A working conventionis always one among several solutions to a problem—butit is a solution none the less.5. ConclusionI have argued that an evolutionary perspective hasthree main implications for moral theory. An evolutionaryperspective has implications for value theory(suggesting a subjective, relative theory ofvalue), can guide us in interpreting the extent towhich various candidate moral rules are consistentwith human moral psychology, and can help usunderstand the function of different moral rules instrategic interaction. And each of these implicationspushes us toward a conventionalist understandingof ethics.A full examination of the significance of socialconventions for moral theory is beyond the scope ofthis paper. I will limit myself to making a few broad,programmatic remarks.First, we should pay attentionto the extent to which existing socialconventions structure socialinteraction and moral choice. Oftentimes, conventions will be sowell entrenched (and so psychologicallyingrained) that we willnot see ourselves as facing decisionsat all. Further, existing conventions structureindividual moral choices in that it is by reference toexisting standards that we justify our actions to others.Justification is not an abstract quality: it is alwaysa matter of justification to someone. 15 To the extentto which we are concerned with justifying our actionsto members of our own communities, we willneed to pay attention to the actual standards—existing,acknowledged social conventions—that applythere, rather than to hypothetical or ideal ones. 16 Weshould never be satisfied to rely upon existing standards;existing social conventions can often be improvedupon. But where conventions exist, they willneed to be heeded; their contribution must be analysed,and they should be ignored only when a plausiblealternative is in sight.Secondly, we should examine the extent to whichconventions should be seen as having normativeforce. Conventions represent—by definition—workingsolutions to social problems. Conventions aremutually beneficial, and thus have some motivationalforce. But conventions will not always beequally beneficial. Some conventions, for example,will be asymmetrical in that they reflect, rather thanmitigate, power imbalances between the parties involved.The possibility of asymmetrical conventionsis both a challenge to the notion of conventions asnormative, and a challenge to the common presumptionthat the notion of equity is essential tomorality.Finally, we need to investigate the possibility ofseeing conventions as a moral technology, and askwhether we can build new conventions to remedyexisting social problems. If existing conventionsserve a useful function, then perhaps we can takewhat we have learned about conventions and applythat knowledge in a forward–looking manner. Oneof the implications of this line of thought is thatgood conventions make good moral choices easier.It might even be said that the ‘real action’ of moralitygoes on long before the individual is ever faced witha decision. This points to a need for attention to thebuilding, rather than the following, of moral rules.Is it possible to engineer new conventions? Are theresome kinds of conventions which are impossible tobuild and maintain, andAuthor’s addressChris MacDonald, Department of Bioethics,Dalhousie University, 5849 University Ave.,Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, B3H 4H7.Email: chris.macdonald@dal.cawhich therefore oughtnot to be sought after? Ofcourse, this possibility dependsupon further investigationof the processesby which conventions (asa sub-set of social normsEvolution and Cognition ❘ 103 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1