Jaak Panksepp and Jules B. Pankseppevolutionary psychology may be encapsulated arein the minds <strong>of</strong> scholars who, all too <strong>of</strong>ten, havelittle wish to immerse themselves in the essentialneuroscientific and genetic issues.We recognize that there are recent strands <strong>of</strong>thought in evolutionary psychology that take positionsmore congenial to our own. For instance, weadmire BADCOCK’s (2000) confrontation with key biologicalissues, as well as his willingness to try tolink evolutionary thought to earlier intellectual traditions.We especially appreciate the way he handlesthe possibility that cultural issues, obviouslyimportant in their own right, may be linked to someimportant heritability findings such as genomic imprinting.Stunning discoveries such as that <strong>of</strong> KEV-ERNE and colleagues (1996), indicating that the development<strong>of</strong> neocortex may be influenced more bymaternally-imprinted genes while the development<strong>of</strong> key emotional areas such as the hypothalamusare governed more by paternally-imprinted genes,provide novel ancestral–genetic tethers over brainorganization that may have pr<strong>of</strong>ound implicationsfor the nature–nurture controversy.Of course, we remain as intellectually stimulatedby evolutionary psychological stories as anyone. Wehave been especially entertained by the recent willingness<strong>of</strong> some theorists to recognize the importance<strong>of</strong> the emergence <strong>of</strong> artistic endeavors in thesocio–cortical emergence <strong>of</strong> our species (MILLER2000) and <strong>of</strong> course, the view <strong>of</strong> language as partly asocial-grooming adaptation (DUNBAR 1995) whichfits nicely with some animal social-systems data(PANKSEPP 1998a). However, we would again adviseevolutionists to view the neocortex as the generalpurposeplayground for our basic attentional, emotionaland motivational systems, as opposed to theirsources. Indeed, it may well be that such a generalpurposeassociational spaces are the ideal playgroundsfor the many dimensions <strong>of</strong> human creativityand entertainment, both abundantly seriousand humorous depending on the depth <strong>of</strong> our emotionalpersonalities as muchAuthors’ addressJaak Panksepp and Jules B. Panksepp,J.P. Scott Center for Neuroscience, Mind &Behavior, Departments <strong>of</strong> <strong>Psychology</strong> andBiological Sciences, Bowling Green StateUniversity. Emails: jpankse@bgnet.bgsu.eduor julesp@caspar.bgsu.eduas anything else. With ourneocortex we can do whateverwe can imagine—and because<strong>of</strong> the mass <strong>of</strong> generalpurpose associational spacethat we possess, there are fewobvious limits to our imagination.This affords us great libertiesin our humanistic endeavorsand helps create great havoc for ourscientific ones.We would simply note that the expansion <strong>of</strong> instinctsat the turn <strong>of</strong> the previous century is nowbeing matched by the postulation <strong>of</strong> geneticallymodularized cognitive functions. <strong>The</strong> “expansion<strong>of</strong> instincts” failed scientifically because they werenot tethered to brain systems, and the expansion <strong>of</strong>“modularized” functions may have a comparablefate for similar reasons. A recent, and more guardedattempt to bring instinctual systems back to theforefront <strong>of</strong> our thinking (e.g., PANKSEPP 1998a) hasbeen premised on only entertaining basic psycho–behavioral entities for which there exist robust andconverging neuroscientific evidence. This also givesus considerable confidence in defining what types<strong>of</strong> systems we need to study more earnestly in humans,while preventing mere human creativityfrom being the major guide <strong>of</strong> what does or does notexist in the natural organization <strong>of</strong> our minds. If wecarefully work out the fundamental neuro-psychologicalprocesses that we share with other animals,we will be in a better position to comprehend whatis truly unique in our own mind/brains.Our implicit aim in the target article was tostrongly encourage similar constraints in evolutionarypsychological thought. Obviously, there aremany stories that remain to be told around this newintellectual campfire, and the likelihood that primitiveforms <strong>of</strong> affective self-representation still link usto a deep animalian past may be a worthy concept formainstream thought in evolutionary psychology(PANKSEPP 1998a,b). Indeed, this view may allow us tobetter understand and harmonize scientific and humanisticendeavors. We do hope that an increasingnumber <strong>of</strong> scholars will begin to incorporate the evolutionarypassages <strong>of</strong> deep-time into their considerations<strong>of</strong> the evolved nature <strong>of</strong> human mind-flesh…most especially in ways that can lead to the deep empiricalevaluation <strong>of</strong> ideas. Being inheritors <strong>of</strong> a vastand to some extent, general-purpose cerebral canopy,the “demoralizing” fact thatour mental activities are alsoconstrained by our instinctualtendencies need no longer beseen as being at odds with ourmore open-ended and nobledesires. With a modest degree<strong>of</strong> mental flexibility, theycould serve as a foundation fora new humanism.Evolution and Cognition ❘ 4 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1
A Synopsis <strong>of</strong> “<strong>The</strong> <strong>Seven</strong>s <strong>Sins</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Evolutionary</strong> <strong>Psychology</strong>”ReferencesBadcock, C. (2000) <strong>Evolutionary</strong> <strong>Psychology</strong>: A Critical Introduction.Polity Press: Cambridge UK.Buss, D. M. (1999) <strong>Evolutionary</strong> <strong>Psychology</strong>: <strong>The</strong> New Science<strong>of</strong> the Mind. Allyn and Bacon: Boston.Cosmides, L./Tooby, J. (2000) <strong>Evolutionary</strong> psychology andthe emotions. In: Lewis, M./Haviland, J. (eds) <strong>The</strong> Handbook<strong>of</strong> Emotions, 2nd edition. Guilford: New York, pp.91–116.Dunbar, R. (1995) Grooming, Gossip and <strong>The</strong> Evolution <strong>of</strong>Language. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.Fodor, J. (2000) <strong>The</strong> Mind Doesn’t Work That Way, <strong>The</strong>Scope and Limits <strong>of</strong> Computational <strong>Psychology</strong>. <strong>The</strong> MITPress: Cambridge, MA.Keverne, E. B./Fundele, R., et al. (1996) Genomic imprintingand the differential roles <strong>of</strong> parental genomes in brain development.Developmental Brain Research 92: 91–100.Miller, G. (2000) <strong>The</strong> Mating Mind: How Sexual ChoiceShaped the Evolution <strong>of</strong> Human Nature. William Heinemann:London UK.Panksepp, J. (1998a) Affective Neuroscience, <strong>The</strong> Foundations<strong>of</strong> Human and Animal Emotions. Oxford UniversityPress: New York.Panksepp, J. (1998b) <strong>The</strong> periconscious substrates <strong>of</strong> consciousness:Affective states and the evolutionary origins <strong>of</strong>the SELF. Journal <strong>of</strong> Consciousness Studies 5: 566–582.Panksepp, J. (2001) At the interface between the affective,behavioral and cognitive neurosciences. Decoding theemotional feelings <strong>of</strong> the brain. Brain and Cognition, inpress.Panksepp, J./Panksepp, J. B. (2000) <strong>The</strong> seven sins <strong>of</strong> evolutionarypsychology. Evolution and Cognition 6(2): 108–131.Tooby, J./Cosmides, L. (2000) Toward mapping the evolvedfunctional organization <strong>of</strong> mind and brain. In: Gazzaniga,M.S. (ed) <strong>The</strong> New Cognitive Neuroscience, 2nd edition.MIT Press: Cambridge MA, pp. 1167–1178.Evolution and Cognition ❘ 5 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1
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