The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology - Konrad Lorenz Institute

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Russell Gardner, Jr.ReferencesBakker, C./Gardner, R./Koliatsos, V./Kerbeshian, J./Looney, J.G./Sutton, B./Swann, A./Verhulst, J./Wagner, K. D./Wamboldt, F./Wilson, D. R. (2000) The Social Brain: AUnifying Foundation for Psychiatry. A manuscript submittedfor publication composed by the Research Committeeof the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP).Calvin, W. H. (1990) The Ascent of Mind: Ice Age Climatesand the Evolution of Intelligence. Bantam Books: NewYork.Diamond, J. (2001) Freud, influential yet unloved: of science’sbig 2, only Darwin gets respect these days. The NewYork Times, Feb 17, 2001: 21.Donald, M. (1991) Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stagesin the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. Harvard UniversityPress: Cambridge MA.Dunbar R. I. M. (1996) Grooming, Gossip, and The Evolutionof Language. Harvard University Press: Cambridge MA.Finger, S. (2000) Minds Behind the Brain: A History of the Pioneersand Their Discoveries. Oxford University Press:New York.Gardner, R. (1982) Mechanisms in manic–depressive disorder:An evolutionary model. Archives of General Psychiatry39: 1436–1441.Gardner, R. (1988) Psychiatric Syndromes as Infrastructurefor Intraspecific Communication. In: Chance, M. R. A. (ed)Social Fabrics of the Mind. Lawrence Erlbaum: Hove (EastSussex), pp 197–226.Gardner, R. (1996) Psychiatry needs a basic science titled sociophysiology.Biological Psychiatry 39: 833–834Gardner, R. (1997) Sociophysiology as the basic science ofpsychiatry. Theoretical Medicine 18: 335–356Gardner, R. (1998a) The brain and communication are basicfor clinical human sciences. British Journal of Medical Psychology71: 493–508.Gardner, R. (1998b) Language and stories: Thinking of dinosaursin Mexico. The Across-Species Comparisons and Psychopathology(ASCAP) Newsletter 11(2): 20–27.Gardner, R. (2001) Exegesis of R. Michels’ “Thinking WhileListening”. The Across-Species Comparisons and Psychopathology(ASCAP) Bulletin 2(1): 10–15Gardner, R. and Grossman, W. I. (1975) Normal Motor Patternsin Sleep in Man. Chapter 3 in: Weitzman, E. D. (ed)Advances in Sleep Research, Volume II. Spectrum Publications:New York, pp. 67–107.Gardner, R./Gustavson, J. C./Gustavson, C. R. (1985) Alphabehavior in manics as a model communicational state. InvitedPresentation at Conference entitled “The Ethology ofPsychiatric Populations”, co-sponsored by The Animal BehaviorSociety & The International Society of HumanEthology, Raleigh, North Carolina.Gilbert, P./Bailey, K. G. (eds) (2000) Genes on the Couch.Taylor & Francis: Philadelphia PA.Kandel, E. R./Squires, L. R. (2000) Neuroscience: Breakingdown scientific barriers to the study of the brain and mind.Science 290: 1113–1120.Lieberman, P. (2000) Human Language and Our ReptilianBrain: The Subcortical Bases of Speech, Syntax, andThought. Harvard University Press: Cambridge MA.Luhrman, T. M. (2000) Of Two Minds: The Growing Disorderin American Psychiatry. Alfred A. Knopf: New York.MacLean, P. D. (1990) The Triune Brain in Evolution: Role ofPaleocerebral Function. Plenum: New York NY.Mayr, E. (1982) The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity,Evolution, and Inheritance. Harvard University Press:Cambridge MA.McGuire, M. T. & Troisi, A. (1998) Darwinian Psychiatry. OxfordUniversity Press: New York.Panksepp, J. (1998) Affective Neuroscience: The Foundationsof Human and Animal Emotions. Oxford University Press:New York.Panksepp, J./Burgdorf, J. (2000) 50-kHz chirping (laughter?)in response to conditioned and unconditioned tickle-inducedreward in rats: Effects of social housing and geneticvariables. Behavioural Brain Research 115: 25–38.Panksepp, J./Panksepp, J. B. (2000) The seven sins of evolutionarypsychology. Evolution and Cognition 6(2): 108–131.Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (2000) Speaking in too many tongues.Book review of Lieberman, P. (2000) Human Language andOur Reptilian Brain. Harvard University Press: Cambridge.Nature 408: 403–404.Pinker, S. (1994) The Language Instinct: How the Mind CreatesLanguage. William Morrow: New York.Price, J. S. (1967) Hypothesis: the dominance hierarchy andthe evolution of mental illness. Lancet 2: 243–246.Price, J./Sloman, L./Gardner, R. Jr./Gilbert, P./Rohde, P.(1994) The social competition hypothesis of depression.British Journal of Psychiatry 164: 309–315. Reprinted in:Baron-Cohen, S. (ed) (1997) The Maladapted Mind: ClassicReadings in Evolutionary Psychopathology. PsychologyPress: Hove (East Sussex).Rabinbach, A. (1990) The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue,and the Origins of Modernity. University of CaliforniaPress: Berkeley.Scott, J. P./Fuller, J. L. (1965) Dog Behavior: The Genetic Basis.University of Chicago Press: Chicago.Scott, J. P. (1989) The Evolution of Social Systems. Gordonand Breach Science Publishers: New York.Sloman, L./Price, J. S./Gilbert, P./Gardner, R. (1994) Adaptivefunction of depression: Psychotherapeutic implications.American Journal of Psychotherapy 48: 401–416.Smith, C. U. M. (1993) Evolutionary biology and psychiatry.British Journal of Psychiatry 162: 149–153.Stevens, A./Price, J. S. (1996) Evolutionary Psychiatry: A NewBeginning. London: Routledge.Sulloway, F. J. (1992) Freud: Biologist of the Mind. Beyondthe Psychoanalytic Legend. Harvard University Press:Cambridge.Evolution and Cognition ❘ 30 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1
Gerhard MeisenbergDegrees of ModularityTHE TARGET ARTICLE BYPanksepp and Panksepp(P&P) is about theholy grail of the psychologicalsciences: to generatea description of thehuman mind that can bemapped on the descriptionof the neural circuitrystudied by neuroscientists.P&P’s questionis whether evolutionarypsychology, in the formthat emerged during the1990s, is a good startingpoint for this grand synthesisand whether it is atall compatible with whatwe already know aboutthe brain.The variety of evolutionarypsychology criticizedby P&P is based inlarge part on the writingsof Leda COSMIDES andJohn TOOBY. Its core assumptionis the principleof massive modularity,also known as the SwissArmy Knife model. It postulatesdozens to hundredsof special-purposemechanisms, each ‘designed’ by evolution to solvean adaptive problem (KENRICK/SADALLA/KEEFE 1998;PINKER 1994; TOOBY/COSMIDES 1992). According toFODOR (1983), a module is a functionally specializedprocessing device. It is informationally encapsulated,working only on a narrow set of inputs specifiedby its input connections; it produces a specialized,stereotyped, ‘shallow’ output; it is hard-wired,developing during ontogenesis without the need foreffortful learning; and its inner workings are not accessibleto introspection: it is cognitively impenetrable.AbstractIt is argued that the distinction between cognitive andmodular functions as originally proposed by J. FODOR(1983) is valid, but that two types of modular functionsshould be distinguished: (1) hard-wired ‘primary’modules that are mainly but not exclusivelysubcortical and are mainly concerned with motivation(e.g. fear conditioning); and (2) ‘modularized’functions that are mainly cortical, are shaped by recurrentsensory and/or cognitive input, and are concernedmainly with sensory analysis and motorcontrol (e.g. language). A strict distinction betweenhard-wired subcortical circuits and non-modular corticalfunctions, as proposed by Panksepp and Panksepp,is rejected. Also the ‘Swiss army knife model’ ofevolutionary psychology is held to be simplistic. Insteadit is proposed that many brain mechanisms, includingthe cognitive system, are multi-purpose.These ‘guns for hire’ are recruited by functionally specializedmodules to produce adaptive behavior. It isargued that the most useful conceptual framework isan expanded ethological model in which specializedbrain systems may use either sensory or cognitive inputand may produce either behavioral or cognitiveoutput.Key wordsEvolutionary psychology, modularity, cognitive system,exaptation.The special-purposedevices of COSMIDES andTOOBY have the essentialproperties of FODOR’smodules, with the additionalspecification thatthey evolved as adaptiveresponses to challengesthat were repeatedly encounteredin ancestral environments.However, forFODOR modularity waslimited to the sensory andmotor periphery of themind while the cognitivesystem proper was nonmodular.COSMIDES andTOOBY have dropped thisdistinction by claimingthat also cognition itself isdomain-specific, specialpurpose,and effectivelymodular. The prominentexamples for this view areCHOMSKY’s theory of universalgrammar, recentlypopularized by StevenPINKER (PINKER 1994), andthe finding that deonticreasoning routines—thatis, reasoning about socialinteractions—differ fromreasoning in other domains in adaptively meaningfulways (COSMIDES/TOOBY 1992).FODOR drew his examples of modularity from thesensory and motor systems which are in large partcortical. The modular systems that P&P are interestedin are special-purpose subcortical circuits thatare concerned with motivation and emotion. P&Pinsist that the closest we have to evolved specialpurposedevices for dealing with adaptive challengesare the subcortical mechanisms that generate actiontendencies, emotions, and affective states. They offerwhat looks like a dichotomy between subcorticalEvolution and Cognition ❘ 31 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1
Page 1 and 2: ContentsEvolutionary Psychology: An
Page 3 and 4: A Synopsis of “The Sevens Sins of
Page 5 and 6: A Synopsis of “The Sevens Sins of
Page 7 and 8: Minding the Brainon the basis of re
Page 9 and 10: Minding the Brainamong bona fide et
Page 11 and 12: Minding the Brainin their language
Page 13 and 14: Minding the BrainReferencesBateson,
Page 15: “La plus ça change…”simple c
Page 18 and 19: Linda MealeyReferencesAlcock, J. (1
Page 20 and 21: Carlos StegmannComments on Jaak Pan
Page 22 and 23: Carlos Stegmanntive mechanisms. Mos
Page 24 and 25: Carlos StegmannReferencesCarnap, R.
Page 26 and 27: Russell Gardner, Jr.these subcortic
Page 28 and 29: Russell Gardner, Jr.The enormous sw
Page 32 and 33: Gerhard Meisenbergmodular systems a
Page 34 and 35: Gerhard Meisenbergstraight into the
Page 36 and 37: Gerhard Meisenbergcan assume new fu
Page 38 and 39: Gerhard MeisenbergNishimura, H./Has
Page 40 and 41: Ian Pitchfordother biological resou
Page 42 and 43: Ian Pitchfordappreciation that the
Page 44 and 45: Ian Pitchfordin developmental psych
Page 46 and 47: Scott AtranThe Case for Modularity:
Page 48 and 49: Scott Atranvant domain. For example
Page 50 and 51: Scott Atranpalm lines. From the fac
Page 52 and 53: Scott Atrangroups of species: snake
Page 54 and 55: Scott AtranLittle by little, biolog
Page 56 and 57: Jaak Panksepp and Jules B. Panksepp
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Jaak Panksepp and Jules B. Panksepp
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Shulamith Kreitlertion—he said on
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Shulamith Kreitlercognitive process
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Shulamith KreitlerBeliefs about Sel
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Shulamith KreitlerInterpersonally-s
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Shulamith Kreitlercreased complexit
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Shulamith Kreitlerof plasticity. At
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Shulamith Kreitlerdevelopmental lev
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Shulamith KreitlerKreitler, S./Chem
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Chris MacDonaldEvolutionary EthicsV
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Chris MacDonaldand… the goods of
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Chris MacDonaldMexyzYoux y z0 1 30
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Chris MacDonaldmore generally) come
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