The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology - Konrad Lorenz Institute

Chris MacDonaldEvolutionary EthicsValue, Psychology, Strategy and Conventions1. IntroductionThe purpose of this paper 1is to present an exampleof what moral theorywould look like if it tookevolutionary theory seriously.In it, I strive toavoid the errors to whichso many previous attemptshave succumbed.If I succeed in doing so, itis because of my intentmerely to show how DAR-WINIAN thinking improvesthe empirical basisupon which we constructmoral theories. At nopoint do I try to derivefoundational moral valueseither from nature inthe broadest sense orfrom the process of evolutionitself. My project isbased on the widely-held assumption that moral decisionmaking requires both values and facts. Knowinga bit about evolution can help make it clear whatthe relevant facts are. Here, I do not intend to discussbiological evolution in particular, but evolution inthe broadest sense. Evolution takes place whereverthere is variation, replication, mutation, and differentialsurvival according to inherited traits. Thusevolutionary theory applies to (at least) biologicalorganisms, certain computer programs, cultures,and ideas.At the heart of my project lies the claim that moralstandards are the products of biological and culturalevolution. Biological evolution has given us brainscapable of certain cognitive tasks, and capable ofmanifesting certain emotions. On top of this biopsychologicalsubstrate, cultural evolution has builtAbstractThe purpose of this paper is to present an example ofwhat moral theory would look like if it took evolutionarytheory seriously. First, I examine briefly the implicationsthat accepting evolutionary theory has forvalue theory. Secondly, I suggest that an evolutionaryperspective can shed new light on moral psychology.Finally, I suggest that an evolutionary perspectiveclears the way for a moral perspective that focuses onthe function and development of HUMEAN social conventions.I strive to avoid the errors to which so manyprevious attempts at grounding ethics in evolutionhave succumbed. If I succeed in doing so, it is becausemy intent is merely to show how DARWINIAN thinkingimproves the empirical basis upon which we constructmoral theories. At no point do I try to derive foundationalmoral values either from nature in the broadestsense or from the process of evolution itself.Key wordsEthics, convention, psychology, function, game theory.Evolution and Cognition ❘ 98 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1a wide range of particularnorms and conventions.The field of ethics can beinterpreted as being devotedto influencing thecourse that the evolutionof these norms and conventionstakes.The basic claim of thispaper is that attention toevolutionary theoryshould have two mainconsequences for moraltheory. First, attention toevolutionary theory (as itapplies to ethics) shoulddraw attention to the fieldof evolutionary psychology,as a way of enrichingour understanding ofmoral psychology. Secondly,it should draw ourattention to the study ofsocial conventions, understoodas regularities of behaviour, sustained by ashared interest in coordination and an expectationthat others will cooperate.Why social conventions? To begin with, asGAUTHIER (1991, p18) argues, we no longer acceptthe world-view upon which absolutist conceptionsof morality depend. 2 Thus we no longer have accessto plausible notions of inherent and intrinsic valueupon which to base ideal moral codes. 3 An evolutionaryview can only be founded on a subjectiveand relative theory of value. 4 Such a value-theoryleads us to ask what moral rules—what social structures—wouldaid in the pursuit of whatever it is thatwe value. 5 What moral rules have we agreed upon,and what moral rules could we agree upon, in pursuitof what we want? That is, the evolutionary perspectivemust lead us to focus on the extent to which