The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology - Konrad Lorenz Institute

A Continuing Critique of Evolutionary Psychologyand theoretical attention than any other faculty ofthe human mind. Clearly language does not merelyarise through SKINNERIAN associations, and we are asattracted to the view of a deep-structure for languageas much as anyone, but we agree with CHOM-SKY that it is premature to genetically map it ontoneocortical areas of the brain. Of all the non-trivial‘modules’ that have been proposed (i.e., thosebeside the straightforward sensory and motorcapacities of the brain), those devoted to languageare clearly among the most compelling.ATRAN provides a balanced overview and a vigorousdefense of modularity with language as the centerpieceof his argument. We agree with much of hisanalysis, but we still think that it is wiser to hold offon any strong, genetically-guided modularity view,since the arguments against a uniquely human geneticguidelines for language remain quite compelling.We think many other organisms could also exhibitlanguage if they too had a much more complexneural space for general-purpose, perceptual/cognitiveprocessing within their neocortices and more sophisticatedvoiceboxes. Yes, we agree that languagehas become a very adaptive tool for the human species,but so have many of the other emergent propertiesthat culture permits. We think that all may agreethat reading and writing are not derived from ourgenetic heritage, and it is a pity that some of us havecaved in so rapidly to the view that our vocal expressionsof language, at least in their basic outlines, areconstructed in such a manner. We certainly agreethat many spandrels can emerge from a vast, predominantlygeneral-purpose learning organ (i.e., theneocortex) which ultimately (i.e., epigenetically) willcontain functionally distinct neural circuits.The most critical issue in our minds is whether anewborn baby has the intrinsic neural circuitry forlanguage or only the intrinsic proclivity to babblewhile it perceives the world, points to the world,grasps objects in the world, manipulates the worldin a self-referential way (all very primitive mammalianabilities) and finally begins to associate theseongoing vocalizations to certain activities in waysthat gradually grow into the vast complexities of humanlanguage. The only issue that we felt we hadraised with this example of modularity was whetherour genes contain the rudiments of a uniquely humanlanguage, or whether they merely help constructa well-placed voice box and resonance chamberfor making complex sounds that can interactwith the enormous RAM-space in the cortex, withlanguage as its final product. ATRAN provides a vigorousdefense of a sophisticated variant of the acceptedwisdom and we chose, largely for didactic purposes,to take the contrary position that is certainly not falsifiedby evidence thus far. Our main goal was to highlightthe simple fact that in our evolutionary thinking,we should not stray from the availableneurodevelopmental evidence to conjectures aboutthe potential evolutionary sources of the final producttoo quickly. This is a primary reason why we supportthe comparative study of subcortical processesso ardently, for there is much more assurance of havingrelevance to our neuro-genetic understanding ofhuman behavior.We should all be more willing to consider that agreat deal of communicative intent and its associatedpragmatics may arise from ancient processes weshare with other animals. We believe that humanswould have no lingusitic competence without thebrain systems that exist below the neocortex and ifone can appreciate this point, one may also understandwhy the human neocortex may not require agenetically dictated language ‘module’ to have communicativecompetence (e.g., BROCA’S and WER-NICKE’s Areas may emerge developmentally becauseof other compatible multi-modal functions of thesetissues). Moreover, we hazard the prediction thatonce the neocortical circuits for language are completelyelucidated, it will be impossible to simulatelinguistic competence in a program that instantiatesonly those higher cerebral processes. In other words,the likely result of this thought experiment would bethat by itself, the unique human neocortical architecturecould not generate, certainly not motivate, asubstantially meaningful human language. Indeed,we note that at least a third of classic KANNER-typeautistic children are incapable of speech throughouttheir lives, although they do not typically have anyhigher cerebral dysfunctions—it is simply that theirhigher brain areas are not well connected to subcorticalsystems (BAUMAN/KEMPER 1995).Let us be frank about our position: Just as we believethere are many subcortical faculties that are absolutelyessential for the types of psychological processeswhich ATRAN discusses, we also believe thatthere are bound to be some cortical faculties of considerableimportance for the emergence of humanlanguage. In describing the cortex as a general-purposetype of ‘information processor’, we are notcommitted to the view that it is nothing but a generalpurpose associative tool. Cortical processing isguided by many subcortical processes, and indeedwe have previously envisioned that there are cortical‘spheres of influence’ for higher-order processing ofinformation relevant to various emotional and mo-Evolution and Cognition ❘ 69 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1