The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology - Konrad Lorenz Institute

Minding the Brainamong bona fide ethologists in their comments onthe 1970’s sociobiological revolution. Just like thepresent authors, many ethologists felt that in the1970s their field, too, was on the brink of makinginteresting discoveries and solidifying a new, complex,paradigm for the study of animal behavior (asdemonstrated, e.g., by BATESON/HINDE 1976). Butwhen the exploitable-seeming new sociobiologicalframework arrived, many ethologists chose to focuson only one of TINBERGEN’s four questions, the questionabout function, and this served to drive ethologyinto a narrow direction (BATESON/KLOPFER1989). (Recently, though, the sociobiology ‘goldrush’ appears to be over, and the tide has turnedback toward a more complex ethological approach,e.g., KREBS/DAVIES 1997).But the PANKSEPPs do not only criticize evolutionarypsychology on scientific grounds, they alsowarn the field about potential political consequences.Here it is not clear exactly what they havein mind. The political critics of sociobiology actuallyreasoned in a number of different ways aboutsociobiology. The idea of a genetically based universalhuman nature was anathema for them, becausethey saw this as connected to genetic determinismand other evils. But a further belief was that ‘badscience’ (for the critics, sociobiology and IQ research)would inevitably lead to undesirable socialconsequences. As I have argued (SEGERSTRÅLE 2000),there is no obvious reason why ‘bad’ science (howeverdefined) would be particularly prone to socialabuse; it seems to me that ‘good’ science in thewrong hands would actually be more dangerous. Ifwe apply this to evolutionary psychology, therewould seem to be no inherent connection between,say, belief in modularity of mind and risk of politicalabuse. The PANKSEPPs may simply mean that, justlike sociobiology, evolutionary psychology is goingto be politically attacked as a deterministic, dangerousdoctrine about human nature.If that is what they mean, that has already happened.For instance THORNHILL and PALMER’s (2000)recent book about rape created quite a stir (e.g.,COYNE 2000; SHULEVITZ 2000; for a response seeTOOBY/COSMIDES 2000). And recently there was acollection of critical essays on evolutionary psychology(ROSE/ROSE 2000), which was surprisinglywell received in the popular press at least in theUnited Kingdom. I take this to mean that there is ablossoming market for this kind of moral–cum–scientificcriticism both in the UK and the US—just asthere is a great market for books that explain whywe do what we do. Indeed, a certain symbiosis appearsto prevail between the writers of popular evolutionarypsychology books and their critics—aphenomenon observed already in the sociobiologycontroversy (SEGERSTRÅLE 2000).Of course, evolutionary psychologists have madethe situation rather difficult for political critics. Wellaware of the attacks on sociobiology, they have carefullystated that they are interested in the evolvedhuman mind, not genes, and in a universal humannature, not human differences. They do not employpopulation-genetic models, and do not address geneticdifferences between populations. 4 They explicitlydistance themselves from human behavioral genetics(something WILSON needed for hissociobiological approach). This makes it hard toconstrue evolutionary psychologists as racists—thestandard move in left-wing criticism of biologicaltheories of human nature, and one that was muchemployed in the sociobiology controversy (cf. SEG-ERSTRÅLE 2000, esp. ch. 2, 9, and 15). Finally, they areuninterested in IQ differences, which means theyare not connectable either to the various standardaccusations against psychometricians (cf. SEGER-STRÅLE 2000, esp. ch. 10, 12, 13, 14). Indeed, a recentprimer in evolutionary psychology sounds remarkably‘politically correct,’ repudiating explicitly boththe notion of race and the idea of ‘general intelligence’(COSMIDES/TOOBY 1997).Whatever the evolutionary psychologists say,however, it is clear that the former critics of sociobiologydo not like evolutionary psychology, as little asthey like sociobiology (and they typically criticizethese fields together). In their search for scientificand moral/political counter-arguments the opponentsto evolutionary psychology have generated aplethora of different criticisms, not all necessarilycompatible with one another. This is déjà vu, andone needs only look back at the sociobiology controversy.Still, the tone is now more muted, and the critiquemore scientific and not as personal and nasty.One reason for this more cautious approach may bethat it has become harder to stir up general outragearound claims about the evolutionary basis of humanbehavior. At the turn of the millennium theidea of genes influencing behavior has become moreacceptable to the general public. In fact, some worrythat the situation has totally flip-flopped. They fear anew doctrine of ‘genetic essentialism’ will be holdinggenes increasingly responsible for our behavior(NELKIN/LINDEE 1995; cf. SEGERSTRÅLE 2000, ch. 19).This is why veteran critic of sociobiology, StevenROSE (2000), coauthor of Not In Our Genes(LEWONTIN/ROSE/KAMIN 1984), does not any longerEvolution and Cognition ❘ 9 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1