The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology - Konrad Lorenz Institute

A Synopsis of “The Sevens Sins of Evolutionary Psychology”3. The sin of adaptationism. It is well recognizedthat one must always discriminate between adaptationsarising from natural selection and those arisingfrom the emergence of flexible abilities to learnnew skills and strategies. The cortex obviously becomesspecialized for a large number of special purposeskills and abilities during development (manyof which may seem superfically “encapsulated” becausemost of our thoughts are constrained byprimitive emotional systems that regulate our feelings),but current evolutionary psychology providesno special inroads to understanding whichadaptations have truly emerged through natural selection.4. The sin of massive modularity. From a neuroscienceperspective, “modularity” is an obsoleteconcept, resembling the “centers” concept that wasdiscarded by scientists doing brain research severaldecades ago. There are many special-purpose circuitsand systems in subcortical areas of the brain,but those systems are not encapsulated and appearto interact with each other extensively. For instance,during every emotion, the activities of widespreadbrain areas are modified. Obviously, a criticalscientific issue is the degree to which the specializedfunctions of higher cerebral abilities exist as birthrightsand how much they reflect the operation ofdevelopmental programs.5. On the conflation of emotions and cognitions.The cortex mediates many specialized cognitiveabilities. Most of the key systems for mammalianemotionality are subcortically organized, and theneglect of these systems can only lead to a very mistakenview of how emotionality is truly elaboratedin the human brain. Disciplines that focus simplyon the higher cortico–cognitive aspects of emotionalprocessing are bound to make many mistakesabout the fundamental nature of emotions and affectiveprocesses (PANKSEPP 2001).6. The absence of credible neural perspective inEvolutionary Psychology. This is a general criticismof all mind sciences that fail to take real brainissues into consideration. Although the full potentialof the mind emerges from organismic–environmentalinteractions, all foundational issues need tobe linked to our gradually emerging understandingof how specific neural systems function. The neurosciencerevolution has provided enough raw evidencefor everyone to begin thinking more clearlyabout those underlying brain issues.7. Anti-organic bias or the computationalist/representationalistmyth. There have always beentwo grand perspectives for explaining the organizationof mind—mind as an organic process and mindas a “spiritual” process that can exist independentlyof the material world. The modern computationalview still tends to subscribe to a modern variant ofthe latter view. From a non-dualistic, materialisticperspective, that may be highly misleading. Allminds are probably strongly constrained by the organic–neuralprocesses by which they are instantiated.To neglect those issues, in preference for a strictcomputationalist view, is likely, we believe, to retarddeep understanding. In our reply to the commentators,we highlight a recent critique by FODOR (2000),one of the great promoters of the computationalism,who now agrees that grave errors have beenmade during the cognitive revolution.Our criticisms do not apply equally to all existinglines of psycho–evolutionary thought, but mainlyto the rhetorically most audible social psychologicalvariants that arose from the ashes of the contentious“sociobiology wars” of the late 1970s and early80s. Additional issues could have been raised, suchas the massive interactions of certain well-characterizedbrain systems (e.g., dopamine, norepinephrine,serotonin, acetylcholine, GABA and glutamate)which participate heavily in all of the processesabout which evolutionary psychologists opine. Severalrelated “sinful” tendencies could have beenhighlighted, but they all ultimately relate to the failureof Evolutionary Psychology to assume a deeplyorganic stance that fully respects the role of developmentalsystems in the epigenetic creation ofhigher mental faculties.Our overall view is that the developmental interactionsbetween ancient, special-purpose circuitsand more recent, general-purpose brain systems,such as those found in the neocortex, can generatemany of the “modularized” human abilities thatEvolutionary Psychology has entertained. By simplyaccepting the remarkable degree of neocortical plasticity,especially during human development, genetically-dictated,sociobiological “modules” beginto resemble products of dubious human ambitionrather than sound scientific inquiry. We believe thatif Evolutionary Psychology attempts to construct aview of human nature based upon inclusive-fitnessissues and improbable neurological assumptions,while continuing to avoid a substantive confrontationwith our ancient animalian heritage, it is aslikely to retard lasting scientific progress as to advanceit. In short, the only place many concepts ofEvolution and Cognition ❘ 3 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1