The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology - Konrad Lorenz Institute

Chris MacDonaldMexyzYoux y z0 1 30 1 31 2 11 3 12 1 05 1 0changed your behaviour unilaterally. The only wayeither of us can improve our own situation is for bothof us to agree on a new equilibrium. BINMORE’s claimis that moral norms are coordination mechanismsthat allow us to deal with quandaries such as this.According to BINMORE, moral norms are coordinatingconventions for the selection of equilibria. Thisis the functionalist description of moral standards towhich an evolutionary perspective leads us. But howcan we endorse a perspective that ‘reduces’ moralityto convention? We turn to this question next.4.2 Social conventionsFigure 1: Choosing a Social Contract. The payoff pairs are{payoff to me, payoff to you}, where payoffs are assumed tocorrespond to preferences. 5 is best, 0 worst.toward a social contract, then x, y, and z representdifferent sets of rules that we could each choose tolive by.In this case, the outcomes {z,x} (at bottom left),{y,y} (centre), and {x,z} (top right) are all ‘equilibria’.That is, for each of those pairs, my choice is my bestpossible reply to your choice, and your choice is yourbest possible reply to my choice. For example, if Ichoose z, you are best off if you choose x, and if youchoose x, I am best off if I choose z. Equivalently, wecan say that if you and I are already in a situationwhere I am playing x and you are playing z, neitherof us can benefit by unilaterally changing his behaviour.The same is true for the outcome pairs {y,y} and{x,z}.(This game would be a simple matter of coordination,were it not for the fact that the payoffs in twoof the three equilibria are asymmetrical. If the payoffsin all three equilibria were symmetrical, then wewould find it easy to agree which equilibrium wasbest: it would just be a matter of coordinating ourefforts. 11 As it stands, the example above poses a hardmoral problem.)In the example at hand, we know that we’re betteroff cooperating than not cooperating, but we disagreeover which project to cooperate on (i.e., whichsocial contract to choose). If we are currently bothplaying y, (i.e., in the centre of the matrix) then Iwould prefer that we move to the lower–left of thepayoff matrix, but I can’t move us there by myself.Changing my behaviour unilaterally would makeme worse off. Similarly, you would prefer that wemove to the upper–right of the payoff matrix, butyou would be worse-off than you are now if youThe term ‘convention’ has been much abused incommon parlance and in various literatures. It isoften used as a synonym for ‘custom’ or ‘fashion’ or‘habit.’ As used by moral philosophers, it often has aderogatory flavour; the principles justified withinthe framework of one or another moral theory, forexample, are often contrasted with ‘mere social convention’.Both the sloppy and pejorative usages areunfortunate. We should seek to reclaim this undervaluedconcept, for use in both moral theory andapplied ethics. For our purposes here, we will givethe concept more content, differentiating conventionsfrom traditions, customs, norms, prejudices,and other such regularities of behaviour and belief.Conventions, here, will be defined in the HUMEANsense as regularities of behaviour, sustained by ashared interest in coordination and an expectationthat others will cooperate. Conventions, then, canbe defined in terms of these three key concepts: aregularity of behaviour; an interest in coordination;and an expectation of cooperation. The degree towhich various conventions will embody these threecharacteristics will vary, but all three characteristicswill always be present to some degree. Examples includethe everyday conventions of lining up atbanks, keeping promises, and buying alternatingrounds of beer at the pub, as well as such seriousconventions as avoiding killing non-combatants inwar. 12 Each of these ways of acting is useful for allconcerned; none of them is strictly arbitrary, nor isany of them necessarily optimal. Like these examples,many of our accepted moral obligations cannotbe understood except as the product of a convention.They are best seen as adequate responses to socialexigencies. The unifying characteristic of each ofthese situations is, roughly, a surprising degree ofsocial cohesion or order. In each situation, the interestsof the individuals involved would, on some descriptionof the situation, lead us to expect a veryEvolution and Cognition ❘ 102 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1