The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology - Konrad Lorenz Institute

“La plus ça change…”simple concept for a more complex one needs to bepointed out—much as does the reification of theterm ‘gene’ in the commonly used phrase ‘a gene forx behavior’—but however unfortunate such substitutionmay be, it is a ubiquitous phenomenon in thesocial process that is the communication of scienceand spread of knowledge (see also YOUNG/PERSELL2000). The good evolutionary psychologist mightneed to be more careful, but need not be damned forthis sin.Species-centrismLack of a true comparative foundation is, indeed, aweakness of a modern evolutionary psychology thathas forgotten the word ‘ethology’ and the name‘TINBERGEN’ (see DALY/WILSON 1999). Althoughcomparative psychology and ethology were antagonisticdisciplines through much of their early history(JAYNES 1969), most of their differences were resolvedwith the development and joint use of newtechniques in neuroscience and neuroendocrinology(HINDE 1966); even more recently, progress incomputer modeling and evolutionary taxonomyhave made comparative analyses both easier andmore valuable (HALL 1994; HARVEY/PURVIS 1991;LARSON/LOSOS 1996). Still, comparative psychologyand human ethology seem to be undergoing majordecline—or, if not decline, at least further isolationfrom what is now mainstream psychology: conferencesand journals which once attracted and evenshowcased research on both human and other speciesnow tend to specialize in one or the other. (Seediscussions in HIRSCH 1987 and MEALEY 2001.)A case in point to illustrate the consequences ofthis neglect can be drawn from a highly visible researcharea: language. According to evolutionarypsychologists, language is the prime exemplar of arecently-evolved, complex, but uniquely humanfaculty (PINKER 1994, 1997a, 1997b). Unfortunately,to many this status implies that comparative analysisis useless. Indeed, after the once-popular ape studiesdocumented the species-specific nature of humanlanguage, comparative studies virtuallydisappeared. Yet the notion that our language capacityhas its basis in a set of modular functions is onethat absolutely begs for comparative analysis. For example,for decades psycholinguists cited the phenomenonof ‘categorical perception’ of humanspeech sounds as evidence for the specialness of humanlanguage (EIMAS 1985; EIMAS/MILLER 1992;WERKER/LALONDE 1988; LENNEBERG 1967; LIBERMAN/MATTINGLY 1989; ZATORRE et al. 1992) without botheringto determine whether that particular componentof language was indeed, human-specific. Comparativestudies, however, show that it is not (HAUSER1996, 2000); categorical perception is, rather, a preadaptionfor language that has its basis in some otherfeature or function of the brain. Of course, this insightdoes not negate the argument that human languageis special and requires study of human subjects—butit does highlight P&P’s argument thatevolutionary psychologists, by being too speciescentric,have ignored a tremendous resource for hypothesis-generationand hypothesis-testing, as wellas a huge and valuable extant literature (e.g., HAUSER1996, LIEBERMAN 1977).AdaptationismThe possibility that language emerged from a set ofpre-adaptations, or that language itself is a ‘spandrel’(GOULD 1991; GOULD/LEWONTIN 1979) hasbeen hotly debated (PINKER/BLOOM 1990). I happento think that language is not a spandrel. But I alsohappen to think that others of our most complex attributesmight be: specifically, our intelligence andour capacity for self-reflection, which I believe arelikely to be spandrels of our Theory of Mind.My own opinion about what is or isn’t a spandrelis not particularly relevant here, but the idea thatvery complex seemingly designed functions and processesmight be spandrels is, as P&P claim, an ideathat is not only disregarded by most evolutionarypsychologists, but unfairly attacked and evenmocked (e.g., ALCOCK 1998). If evolved features ofthe human brain/mind are likely to be modular asP&P’s brand of evolutionary psychologist claims,then indeed, the most likely place for us to search forspandrels is amongst those features that seem themost generalized and un-modular… such as the ‘g–factor’ of intelligence and the ‘binding factor’ or‘seamless nature’ of self-awareness.Massive modularitySince the structure of the mind is, in some sense, dependentupon the structure of the brain that housesit, it might be the case that some functional mechanismsof the mind map directly onto certain structuresof the brain. While such direct mapping is nota prerequisite for psychic modularity (FODOR 1983),it is plausible (SHALLICE 1988, 1991), and the factthat different parts of the brain do exhibit functionalspecialization has been known for over ahundred years. Not only are specialized structuresEvolution and Cognition ❘ 15 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1