Gerhard MeisenbergNishimura, H./Hashikawa, K./Doi, K./Iwaki, T./Watanabe, Y./Kusuoka, H./Nishimura, T./Kubo, T. (1999) Sign language“heard” in the auditory cortex. Nature 397: 116.Pinker, S. (1994) <strong>The</strong> Language Instinct. Morrow: New York.Platt, M. L./Glimcher, P. W. (1999) Neural correlates <strong>of</strong> decisionvariables in parietal cortex. Nature 400: 233–238.Price, B. H./Daffner, K. R./Stowe, R. M./Mesulam, M. M.(1990) <strong>The</strong> comportmental learning disabilities <strong>of</strong> earlyfrontal lobe damage. Brain 113: 1383–1393.Price, J. L./Carmichael, S. T./Drevets, W. C. (1996) Networksrelated to the orbital and medial prefrontal cortex; a substratefor emotional behavior? Progress in Brain Research107: 523–536.Robbins, T. W./Everitt, B. J. (1996) Neurobehavioural mechanisms<strong>of</strong> reward and motivation. Current Opinion in Neurobiology6: 228–236.Rodman, H. R./Scalaidhe, S. P. O./Gross, C. G. (1993) Responseproperties <strong>of</strong> neurons in temporal cortical visual areas <strong>of</strong>infant monkeys. Journal <strong>of</strong> Neurophysiology 70: 1115–1136.Ryan, M. J. (1998) Sexual selection, receiver biases, and theevolution <strong>of</strong> sex differences. Science 281: 1999–2003.Schultz, W. (1998) Predictive reward signal <strong>of</strong> dopamineneurons. American Journal <strong>of</strong> Physiology 80: 1–27.Spanagel, R./Weiss, F. (1999) <strong>The</strong> dopamine hypothesis <strong>of</strong> reward:Past and current status. Trends in Neurosciences 22:521–527.Tooby, J./Cosmides, L. (1992) <strong>The</strong> psychological foundations<strong>of</strong> culture. In: Barkow, J. H./Cosmides, L./Tooby, J. (eds):<strong>The</strong> Adapted Mind. <strong>Evolutionary</strong> <strong>Psychology</strong> and the Generation<strong>of</strong> Culture. Oxford University Press: New York, Oxford,pp. 19–136.Venter, J. C. and 263 coauthors (2001) <strong>The</strong> sequence <strong>of</strong> thehuman genome. Science 291: 1304–1351.Evolution and Cognition ❘ 38 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1
Ian PitchfordNo Evolution. No CognitionJAAK & JULES PANKSEPPpostulate a striking dichotomybetween ‘geneticallydedicated circuits’for emotions and generalpurposecomputationalspace. <strong>The</strong> former arephylogenetically ancientsubcortical structures, orneurochemical operatingsystems, which have homologiesin many species,and reflect fitness concerns;the latter is subservedby plastic neocortex.<strong>The</strong> research program<strong>of</strong> neuroevolutionarypsychobiology aims toelucidate the way inwhich human abilitiesemerge from developmentalinteractions betweenthese two mechanisms.<strong>The</strong> subcorticalemotional and motivationalsystems constitute“the essential character <strong>of</strong>the human mind”; theymay have distinct variantsin “different lines <strong>of</strong>the human family”, may owe their existence togroup selection, and can “regulate the construction<strong>of</strong> personality differences, as well as social systems”.<strong>Evolutionary</strong> psychologists are exhorted to adoptthis model and thereby enter the ranks <strong>of</strong> the ‘dataconstrained’ instead <strong>of</strong> pursuing the ‘tradition’ <strong>of</strong>COSMIDES and TOOBY, which is described as a “potentiallyvirulent strain <strong>of</strong> neo-DARWINIAN thinking”.Although the PANKSEPPs describe ‘seven sins’ theseembody four complaints: evolutionary psychologistsa). search for adaptive modules where there isonly general-purpose computational space; b). areanthropocentric; c). conflate emotions and cognitions,and d). have an anti-organic bias. However,AbstractAlthough scholars in the natural and human scienceswill generally disavow any belief in distinct materialand immaterial substances contemporary debates arephrased largely in terms that would have been familiarto the Greek philosophers, and which still dividehuman characteristics into ‘divine’ or ‘transcendent’attributes—in modern terminology the surrogateterms are rational, cognitive, discursive, autonomousand creative—and ‘animal’ or ‘corporeal’ attributes—the surrogates being emotional, instinctive, determined,immutable, and bounded. This essential dualismpreserves the three key dichotomies <strong>of</strong> mind/body, cognition/emotion and nature/nurture found inmany, if not most, discussions <strong>of</strong> human nature. Neuroevolutionarypsychobiology’s concern to divide thebrain into determined affective components and unboundedplastic neocortex by employing such conceptsas ‘exaptations’, ‘spandrels’, and ‘emergence’resides firmly within this quasi-theological Westernphilosophical tradition. This dualistic approach providesno coherent foundation for the critique <strong>of</strong> evolutionarypsychology.Key wordsModularity, developmental systems theory, dualism,spandrel, exaptation, brain evolution.the PANKSEPPs readily acknowledgeevidence forthe existence <strong>of</strong> ten ormore modules in the neocortex,and evidence forthe functional integration<strong>of</strong> cognition andemotion demonstratedby the work <strong>of</strong> DAMASIO,LEDOUX, and ROLLS. <strong>The</strong>PANKSEPPs’ rejection <strong>of</strong>evolutionary psychologyemerges from their beliefthat neocortical adaptationsshould be innate,discrete, and detachedfrom subcortical structures,which in turn restson theoretical misconceptionsand their mischaracterization<strong>of</strong> theneur<strong>of</strong>oundational issues.DevelopmentalSystems <strong>The</strong>ory andInnateness<strong>The</strong> PANKSEPPs claim tohave assimilated the prescriptions<strong>of</strong> developmentalsystems theory, as embodied in the work <strong>of</strong>OYAMA (2000b) and GRIFFITHS (1997), but throughouttheir paper they refer to “genetically dedicatedcircuits” and “genetically dictated adaptations”,which suggests that they are not aware that this theoryexplicitly opposes the notion <strong>of</strong> genes as privilegedcausal entities. Indeed, OYAMA has said that“the idea that traits are ‘transmitted’ in heredity,rests on notions <strong>of</strong> genetic programming that areultimately quite preformationist” (OYAMA 2000a,p21). Following LEHRMAN’s (1953) lead, developmentalsystems theorists argue that nature selectsfor outcomes. Any <strong>of</strong> the inherited components <strong>of</strong>the developmental system, which includes genes,Evolution and Cognition ❘ 39 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1
Change language