The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology - Konrad Lorenz Institute

Shulamith Kreitlerof plasticity. At higher evolutionary levels we mayfind meanings that are not identical with a specificaction, for example, a meaning that is evaluated asirrelevant and hence is dismissed without evokingany response, or a meaning that is evaluated as requiringa more complex type of behavior and henceis transferred to the next phase.Similarly, also feedback evaluation is subject todevelopment. Basically, feedback evaluation dependson applying cognitive processes and meaning.Thus, evaluating the outcome of action requiresmatching the outcome with the intent, adjustingboth so that they can be compared, judging the degreeof similarity, and evaluating the result also interms of the current situation and its potentialities.This description fits higher evolutionary levels. Onlower levels the precursor of feedback would consistsimply in recurrent enactment of the action if thedisturbance exists, regardless of whether the actionhad been enacted before and what the goal may havebeen. The action is simply repeated until the goal isattained or a ‘stop circumstance’ sets in (e.g., the organismis distracted, the organism stops because offatigue, the action is inhibited by an internal inhibitingmechanism). In this context it is relevant to citethe observations about infants 5–7 months old tryingagain and again without success to retrieve a toythey had and which was taken away from them (DI-AMOND 1991). Hence, at low evolutionary levels, itmay happen that an action does not attain the goalin any sense, yet it is not followed by another action.At a later evolutionary level, feedback already in thecase of instincts is based on a rigid type of matchingthe actual activity or outcome with the original ‘expectation’or ‘optimal’ pattern. This geneticallybasedyardstick (WIMMER 1995, p45) or ‘inbornteacher’ (LORENZ 1981, p299) is amplified by moreflexible and extended forms of feedback, based onlearned programs stored in memory. One type consistsin evaluating the correspondence between actualaction and stored pattern (KLIX 1980, p102), anotherin estimating the accuracy of reaching the goal(ibid, p104). WIMMER (1995) emphasizes that the latteris anchored in the brain centers of reward andpunishment, so that it uses elementary emotionalreactions as criteria for success and failure of actions.The development of these feedback mechanisms hashelped to dissociate behaviors from specific stimuliand has promoted the occurrence of behaviors incontexts other than those in which they have beenacquired (e.g., conditioned actions) (ibid, pp45–46).With further developments the feedback mechanismsbecome more flexible and expanded, consistingin examining the outcome situation more extensivelyand comparing it in several senses with theoriginal goal(s). At this level, the feedback operationalready includes the vestiges of preparing the nextaction designed to handle the original goal in viewof the experienced failure of the previous action.In the first phase of the CO theory there are at leasttwo occasions for feedback: after the execution of thenon-conditioned or conditioned response, and afterevocation of the orienting reflex. The previous observationsabout the evolution of feedback indicatethat it requires higher evolutionary levels to diagnosefailure in these actions, and in case of failure, itrequires even higher levels to transfer the handlingof the situation to more advanced phases (viz. tomolar action).In line with the CO theory, the second phase isfocused on a more extended elaboration of themeaning of the input and the situation in which itis embedded. This phase is designed to examine, onthe bases of the meanings which emerge, whetheraction is at all indicated. This phase bears evidencefor an advanced evolutionary level. In addition to anextended meaning system, it presupposes the abilitynot to act. Studies with infants suggest that this abilityis based on a more basic ability, which is not toreact in line with innate and conditioned prepotentresponse tendencies. The latter gives one the possibilityof reacting in line with internal tendencies.Extending the potential of inhibiting actions toplanned, considered and possible actions, largelywidens the scope of intentionality and control. Bothabilities of inhibiting action are probably not possiblewithout the frontal cortex (DIAMOND 1991).There seem to be two major evolutionary trendscharacteristic of the second phase. The first and mostobvious one concerns meaning elaboration. Thebroader and more comprehensive the meaning systembecomes, the more extensive gets the meaningelaboration in this context, involving more aspectsof meaning and both types of meaning—the interpersonally-sharedand the personal, in the form ofmeanings as well as beliefs. Correspondingly, the examinationof whether the individual is involved inthe situation is based on an ever-broader basis. Thesecond aspect that undergoes evolution is the criteriafor acting or not acting. If on more primary levelsthe decision follows criteria, such as direct contributionto survival, evolution brings into play furthercriteria, such as potential for promoting the attainmentof some personal goal, the possibility to defendone’s values or to enhance one’s sense of self-identity,etc.Evolution and Cognition ❘ 92 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1