The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology - Konrad Lorenz Institute

A Continuing Critique of Evolutionary Psychologyadaptive, subcortical systems neither precludes or diminishesthe importance of cognitive/neocorticalprocesses in guiding animal or human behavior. Wepostulate that many of the unique human mind/brain processes arise from dedicated subcortical systemsand flexible neocortical systems interactingwith each other, as well as human culture. Moreover,we stand behind our conclusion that the epigeneticmolding of cortical functions is far greater than theadmittedly substantial experiential influences thatalso affect subcortical functions (for a more developedcoverage of our developmental views, see PANK-SEPP 2001a).PITCHFORD suggests that we have not adequatelyabsorbed the prescriptions of developmental systemstheory (e.g., GRIFFITHS 1997; OYAMA 1985)—that weare talking about ‘genetic blueprints’ rather than acceptingthe full scope of the developmentalist challenge.We only suggest that he re-read what we haveactually written about the matter and we suspect hewould be hard put to find as strong an advocacy ofthe brain developmental systems viewpoint as oursamong any other evolutionary psychologists. Someof our past writing on the topic can be found in PANK-SEPP/KNUTSON/PRUITT (1998), PANKSEPP/MILLER,(1996) and PANKSEPP (2000a, 2001a). One of our primarytheses is that irrespective of the complex interactionsbetween genes and environment, operatingsystems that give rise to affective states such as angerand hunger (as well as several others) will invariablyreside in subcortical areas of human and mammalbrains. How these systems are manifested and resolvedat the behavioral level will undoubtedly dependon an animal’s life history, but they will invariablybe manifest through the emerging plasticity ofhigher cortico–cognitive brain systems. The subcorticalexecutive systems for emotional/affective processeshave persisted because they stochastically supportbehavioral phenotypes that produce ‘constant,stable outcomes’ as adaptive solutions to environmentaland social demands. As PITCHFORD notes, ontogeneticevents in the form of gene/environmentinteractions support a large spectrum of phenotypes.Genes may not be ‘blueprints’ per se, however theycan serve as reliable guidelines that promote ‘constant,stable outcomes’ within the general contextsthat their corresponding phenotypes were selected.The blueprint-perspective of genes that PITCHFORDcriticizes, especially with regard to its use of the word‘innate’, is a terribly important issue to clarify. Wealso do not support the notion that the genetic materialcontains pre-determined outcomes. However,genes do carry a certain likelihood of contributing tocertain phenotypes. For example, genes that encodeserotonin-binding membrane proteins invariablycontribute to the expression of natural behaviorslike feeding, mating and aggression (LUCKI 1998).The contributions of such proteins are determinedby complex gene/environment interactions (LESCH/MERSCHDORF 2000). In this regard, nucleotide polymorphismsare inherited characters that can appreciablyalter a gene’s expression (for instance, see LE-SCH et al. 1996). However, genes are also up- anddown-regulated through environment and experiencedependent modulation, which can yield similarresults (LESCH/MERSCHDORF 2000). The guidelinethat a genome carries for specifying the amount ofserotonin transporter proteins on the membranes ofneurons comprising aggression circuitry, for instance,can and will be altered by environmental demandsand individual experiences.As originally stated in the target article, we continueto reiterate PITCHFORD’s affirmation that evolutionarypsychology is well advised to root itself inthe conceptual framework of developmental systemstheory. However, environmentalism is boundto be rather less influential when it comes to thesubcortical neural terrain—at least with regard to thetypes of neural systems that exist, although their intensitieswill no doubt be influenced by differentialearly experiences (PANKSEPP 2001a).As PITCHFORD may have detected, we do disagreewith certain variants of developmental perspectivesas advocated by some members of the philosophicalcommunity, who seem to relegate DNA to less of an‘informational’ molecule than most biologists areprone to agree. We feel that if one aspires to understandthe nature of biologically-evolved functions/adaptations, then it is wiser to put a majority of theirscientific effort into molecular biological approachesand the true study of ontogeny in neural systemsrather than strictly to the study of external issues,even though we acknowledge how incredibly difficultthey are to extricate.Moreover, we hopefully all will agree wholeheartedlywith regard to the vast plasticity of corticallearning functions. However, as we will note towardthe end of this commentary (in the “Behavior-Genetics—AnEssential Key” section), carefully harvestedheritability data does highlight that the variabilityof our basic internal dispositions arecontrolled more by genes than by external environments,while our overt behavior is guided muchmore by learning. This is an issue that the modularityadvocates of evolutionary psychology have yet toeffectively discuss or study.Evolution and Cognition ❘ 65 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1