The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology - Konrad Lorenz Institute

Chris MacDonaldmore generally) come into being, stabilize, andchange. This is fertile territory for evolutionarythought. For although I have given no account hereof the origins of conventions, it seems likely thatmost of them have their origins in some blind(though by no means random) social–evolutionaryprocess. We need to investigate further the social–evolutionary processes by which conventionsevolve. Finally, it seems likely that social thinkinginformed by an evolutionary perspective will best beable to incorporate a suitable focus on the functionof moral standards. And only through such a functionalistperspective can we reclaim moral theory asa practical discipline.Notes1 Parts of this paper were published, in Dutch in 1999, as“Evolutionaire Ethiek: Psychologie en Conventies” (EvolutionaryEthics: Psychology and Conventions), in Ethiek enMaatschappij (Ethics and Society), no. 2, vol. 4, pp. 53–61.The author would like to thank Prof. Peter DANIELSON forthe generous intellectual support that led to the writing ofthis paper. Thanks also to Bryn Williams-Jones, Jason ScottRobert, and Michael Stingl for their helpful comments onvarious versions of this paper, as well as to the anonymousreviewers for this journal.2 GAUTHIER himself refers to such absolutist conceptions as‘KANTIAN/Christian’ conceptions. Clearly, this is a shorthandway of speaking; Christian views vary enormously,and many modern KANTIANS are not Christians.3 Of course, evolutionary success itself does provide an objectivenotion of value, but such success is only necessarilyvaluable from the perspective of genes, or possibly species.Nothing forces us to value it.4 On this view, value is strictly speaking subjective. In anyparticular case, values may be shared—that is, they may beintersubjective—but this will be a contingent matter. Formore on this view of value, see GAUTHIER (1986)’s ChapterII section 4.5 Clearly, such a theory of value does not depend upon evolutionarythinking. HOBBES and HUME—writing before DAR-WIN—held such views. My argument is simply that theevolutionary perspective provides further reason for holdingto such a theory of value.6 For a number of empirical investigations based on computermodelling, see DANIELSON (1999).7 Evolutionary psychology can be seen as a more respectableheir to the role previously played by sociobiology. For moreon this, see MACDONALD (1998).8 It is commonplace in evolutionary theory to talk of evolutionor selective forces ‘designing’ various features. Thissort of talk is merely a metaphor, however—a useful shorthandway of talking about nature’s blind generate–and–testproblem solving.9 It may be that this is a behavioural tendency, without beingwhat I have called an emotional predisposition. That is,emotional commitment to kin may not be the proximalmechanism responsible for kin altruism; the relevantmechanism may be one that involves non-emotional effecton behaviour. If this is the case, it affects only the wordingof the point I make here.10 My choice situation is ‘strategic’ when the success of mystrategy depends on which strategy you choose. GAUTHIERdefines a strategic choice as one “in which the actor takeshis behaviour to be but one variable among others, so thathis choice must be responsive to his expectations of others’choices [and vice versa]”. (GAUTHIER 1986, p21) In parametricchoice, on the other hand, the actor takes his behaviorto be the sole variable in a fixed environment.11 This would then be an instance of what game theorists calla game of pure coordination. A real-life example of a gameof pure coordination is the problem of choosing on whichside of the road to drive.12 I leave it to the reader to think through the sense in whicheach of these cases exemplifies the characteristics of regularity,interest, and expectation.13 Indeed, since the bank queue approximates an n–personiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, traditional game theory tellsus that it is flatly irrational for bank customers to line uppatiently. In my town, at least, I suspect that someone whojumped the queue would be unlikely to face serious opposition,and unilateral deviation is very unlikely to destabilizethe entire convention.14 Aside from queuing, other possible conventions herewould include drawing straws, the game of Rock–Paper–Scissors, taking numbers, sorting by age, and so on.15 As RAWLS (1971, p580) writes, “justification is argumentaddressed to those who disagree with us”. For a discussionof the pervasiveness of this approach to justification as amethodology in contemporary political thought, see NOR-MAN (1998).16 For a concrete example of the ways in which existing conventionsshape choices, see MACDONALD (2000).References:Binmore, K. (1994) Game Theory and the Social Contract,Vol. 1: Playing Fair. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.Cosmides, L./Tooby, J. (1992) Cognitive Adaptations for SocialExchange. In: Barkow, J. H./Cosmides, L./Tooby, J.(eds) The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and theGeneration of Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press,pp. 163–228.Danielson, P. (ed) (1999) Modelling Rationality, Morality,and Evolution. Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science,Vol 7. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Gauthier, D. (1977) The Social Contract as Ideology, Philosophyand Public Affairs 6: 130–164.Gauthier, D. (1986) Morals by Agreement. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.Gauthier, D. (1991) Why Contractarianism? In: Vallentyne,P. (ed) Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays onDavid Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, pp. 15–30.Evolution and Cognition ❘ 104 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1