Carlos StegmannComments on Jaak Panksepp and Jules B.Panksepp’s Paper “<strong>The</strong> <strong>Seven</strong> <strong>Sins</strong> <strong>of</strong><strong>Evolutionary</strong> <strong>Psychology</strong>”IHAVE READ WITH GREATinterest Jaak and JulesB. PANKSEPP’s paper “<strong>The</strong><strong>Seven</strong> <strong>Sins</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Evolutionary</strong><strong>Psychology</strong>”, whosemain thesis meets withmy full agreement, to wit,that evolutionary psychologyshould fully consider,and be consistentwith, the findings <strong>of</strong> cognitiveneuroscience andbrain research, to “remainon the shores <strong>of</strong> soundscientific inquiry”.I would like to extendthis thesis: any disciplinemust fully consider, andbe consistent with, other,related disciplines, to producecredible results. Thisapplies especially in therealm <strong>of</strong> human natureand behavior, which arethe subject <strong>of</strong> many disciplines,among them sociology,political and legalscience, behavioral biologyand comparative behavioralresearch, moralscience, and epistemology, in addition to the twodisciplines that are the subject <strong>of</strong> the paper.In a paper which I have submitted to Evolution &Cognition, “<strong>The</strong> Human Behavior Instinct. How Decisionsfor Action are Reached. An Interdisciplinary<strong>The</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> Human Behavior”, I have posited the followinggeneral postulate to account for the requiredinterdisciplinarity:Abstract<strong>The</strong> commented paper states that, “to remain on theshores <strong>of</strong> sound scientific inquiry” evolutionary psychologyshould be consistent with the findings <strong>of</strong> cognitiveneuroscience and brain research. Thisargument is extended in the present comments. <strong>The</strong>human species is an integrated natural entity composed<strong>of</strong> strata, including the strata <strong>of</strong> socioculturalgroup behavior, <strong>of</strong> individual behavior, and <strong>of</strong> neuralmechanisms. Events or phenomena affecting the entityare one–and–the–same in all and each <strong>of</strong> thestrata, and thus any factually correct explanation <strong>of</strong>human nature, including psychology, must be interdisciplinaryin scope. Psychological phenomena mustbe explainable in terms <strong>of</strong> reductions <strong>of</strong> laws whichgovern the sociocultural stratum, such as those discoveredby Friedrich HAYEK related to the extended order<strong>of</strong> human society, and be reducible in turn to themechanisms that operate in the neurophysiologicalstratum. <strong>The</strong> comments conclude that only such aninterdisciplinary approach can provide a compass tonavigate in the dark sea <strong>of</strong> human brain and mindphenomena.Key wordsInterdisciplinarity, psychology, cognition, human behavior,evolution, neuropsychology.“Living beings, includingHomo sapiens, are integratednatural units orentities (systemic wholes)composed <strong>of</strong> strata, fromthe atomic-particle to thesocio–cultural strata. Stratum-specificnatural lawsapply in each stratum,but events or phenomena,which affect the entity,are one–and–the–same event or phenomenonin all and each <strong>of</strong> thestrata. Since the event orphenomenon is one–and–the–same, there cannotbe any ‘causation’ betweenstrata, but the naturallaws which apply ineach stratum must be reducibleto the laws whichapply in the hierarchicallylower strata; the idea<strong>of</strong> natural law only makessense in this context. Anotherconsequence is thatall the strata <strong>of</strong> an integratedunit evolve together;there can be nostrata with differing rates <strong>of</strong> evolution, as <strong>of</strong> societyand <strong>of</strong> the human beings which compose it—theevolution <strong>of</strong> both is one–and–the–same phenomenon.”<strong>The</strong> commented paper states (p125) that “groupselection” is different from “individual selection”:“Surely, differential survival <strong>of</strong> groups may lead todifferential survival <strong>of</strong> brain mechanisms that onlyEvolution and Cognition ❘ 20 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1
Comments on Jaak Panksepp and Jules B. Panksepp’s Paper “<strong>The</strong> <strong>Seven</strong> <strong>Sins</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Evolutionary</strong> <strong>Psychology</strong>”operate efficiently in groups. Such effects mayemerge more rapidly via group selection than by individualselection.” (My Italics.)But the groups and the individuals that composethem, and the behavioral phenomena, which affectboth groups and individuals, are one–and–the–samething. However, the natural laws, which govern thebehavior <strong>of</strong> groups, must be reducible to the naturallaws, which govern the behavior <strong>of</strong> the individualsthat compose them. This applies to all the integratednatural entities <strong>of</strong> living beings, but is especially relevantfor the natural entity homo sapiens. For thisentity possesses an upper stratum <strong>of</strong> socio–culturalphenomena, which the other entities do not, exceptingmay be some rudiments in the societies <strong>of</strong> greatapes. And here another critique may be added to theobjection that evolutionary psychologists (and sociobiologistsas well) do not sufficiently consider therelevance <strong>of</strong> brain research in their inquiries. <strong>The</strong>phenomena investigated by psychology occur in theindividual behavioral stratum <strong>of</strong> the human entity,which is interposed between the stratum <strong>of</strong> neurophysiologicalphenomena, and the stratum <strong>of</strong> groupbehavior in human society. This stratum has beenthe object <strong>of</strong> Friedrich A. HAYEK’s work (1982, 1988).HAYEK created the concept <strong>of</strong> the spontaneous evolutionaryformation <strong>of</strong> the general laws <strong>of</strong> conductthat govern the extended order <strong>of</strong> human society. <strong>Psychology</strong>,especially evolutionary psychology, shouldconsider the relevance <strong>of</strong> these findings at the level<strong>of</strong> human society, and be able to provide their reductionto individual human behavior. Besides, individualbehavior is also the object <strong>of</strong> comparative behavioralresearch, (LORENZ 1973, 1978; RIEDL 1988), and<strong>of</strong> moral science (Immanuel KANT 1904) 1 . It wouldalso be worthwhile to consider, for finding out howthe brain/mind works, the conclusions <strong>of</strong> epistemology,especially those related to analytic and syntheticcognition (CARNAP 1995). Psychologists, however,seem to be working almost exclusively withinthe limits <strong>of</strong> their own scientific realm.In the final part <strong>of</strong> the commented paper (p125)the following question is posed:“How do we incorporate the strikingly relevantevidence culled from our fellow animals into the exceedinglyanthropocentric modes <strong>of</strong> thought thatcharacterize so much <strong>of</strong> present day psychology?”I do not think that psychology’s modes <strong>of</strong> thoughtare “exceedingly anthropocentric”. <strong>Psychology</strong> is,after all, a human science; its object is the explanation<strong>of</strong> human behavior. <strong>Psychology</strong>, to be effective,must clearly incorporate in its research “the underlyingbrain processes shared by all mammals”(p125). But it must also incorporate the findings <strong>of</strong>comparative behavioral research, <strong>of</strong> moral science,and <strong>of</strong> epistemology, and be effective in providingexplanations (reductions) <strong>of</strong> the socio–cultural behavior<strong>of</strong> groups. <strong>The</strong> referred question is followedimmediately by another one:“How shall we accept our animal heritage withoutdemeaning our vast intelligence?”But our “vast intelligence” is included in our “animalheritage”! As conclusively demonstrated by AdolfHESCHL in his book “<strong>The</strong> Intelligent Genome”(1998), the only possible mechanism <strong>of</strong> creating informationis the random mutation–and–selectionmechanism <strong>of</strong> evolution, the genome being its solerepository. All existing information is innate, andthis information includes the structural and operational‘design’ <strong>of</strong> those vast brain and nerve systems<strong>of</strong> our species, where our “vast intelligence” originates.<strong>The</strong> general overall proposition <strong>of</strong> the commentedpaper is that explanations <strong>of</strong> human behaviorshould arise from the interaction between theobjective cognitive abilities which reside in the massivegeneral-purpose human neocortex, and theemotional and motivational systems which reside inthe very old subcortical brain areas, and not, as proposedby evolutionary psychology, from any “finegrainedmolding <strong>of</strong> special-purpose socio-affectivemechanisms”, or “new and refined emotional modularfunctions that would have emerged in the humanbrain/mind during the past several millionyears <strong>of</strong> human brain evolution”. I quote several passages<strong>of</strong> the paper, related to this proposition, towhich many more may be added:On p108: “…we must remember to be especiallycautious in ascribing discrete special-purpose functionsto brain association areas that appear at birthto be largely general-purpose ‘computational’ devices.On p110: “<strong>The</strong> organization <strong>of</strong> the neocortex, althoughstill constrained by many unknown geneticrules, … may be much more <strong>of</strong> a general-purposecomputational device than modern evolutionarypsychologists have been willing to concede”, and“<strong>The</strong> possibility is remote … that many unique anddetailed epistemological engravings <strong>of</strong> sociobiologicalstrategies (i.e., modules) exist within the humanneocortex.”On p113: “It seems to us that much <strong>of</strong> brain evolutionduring the Pliocene and Pleistocene eras wasbased upon the rapid expansion <strong>of</strong> general-purposecortico-computational space … rather than on anyfine-grained molding <strong>of</strong> special-purpose socio-affec-Evolution and Cognition ❘ 21 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1
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