The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology - Konrad Lorenz Institute

Jaak Panksepp and Jules B. Pankseppassert that simple emotional systems with a modicumof some general-purpose cognitive skill, mayeasily yield some of the most striking folk-psychologicaldiscoveries of evolutionary psychology.Yes, childless, rouge males are more likely to harmthe young whereas fathers and especially mothersare much less likely to do so, especially to their own(DALY/WILSON 1988). Could this simply reflect theprimitive social-bonding mechanisms of the mammalianbrain that promote anti-aggressive attitudesby arousing ‘peace-promoting’ neurochemical activitiesin ancient neural systems? One of the mostspectacular findings in this area is the discovery thata single sexual episode can gradually transform infanticidalmales into tolerant ones, so that they areleast likely to kill young at the time their own offspringenter the world (MENNELLA/MOLTZ 1988). Weanticipate that when investigators probe such matters,they will find that satisfying sexual activitiesarouse the chemistries for nurturant feelings in thehuman brain, just as they do in other animals(CARTER/LEDERHENDLER/KIRKPATRICK 1997).We have no problems with the idea that evolutionarily-derived,socio–sexual adaptations existwithin our mind/brain dynamics, we simply questionthe wisdom of conceptualizing these processesas evolved, cortico–cognitive ‘modules’. At the sametime, we do agree with carefully analyzing how humancognitive activities change as a function of suchaffective changes (which will eventually be capableof being precisely manipulated in humans viaknowledge derived from the study of the corresponding,emotion-modulating chemistries in animalmodels). There are other interesting emotionalexamples to consider from the vantage of the principleof a cross-species parsimony (PANKSEPP 1998a).We certainly believe that such ancient emotional dynamicsare bound to have remarkably strong effectson the cognitive dynamics of human minds. However,the study of such processes will require developmentof a more vigorous, empirically deep psychology(PANKSEPP 1999; SOLMS/NERSESSIAN 1999).Group SelectionIn the initial paper, we chose to leave a variety of ourarguments open-ended, so we could attract pointedcriticism about issues about which we all truly knowvery little. The most poignant example was our willingnessto consider a viewpoint that is viewed as ananathema by most evolutionists. Namely, the conceptof group selection. In truth, we are quite agnosticon this issue and simply urge our colleagues to bemuch more open-minded on the topic than manyhave typically been. First, let us be unambiguous oncertain issues. We certainly agree that evolutionprogresses as a function of the survival of gene patterns.The functional unit of selection must be theindividual that carries genes and at least in ‘higher’animals, that negotiates (typically emotionally)with other members of a species to pass on its genes.In such interactions, affect may be the main currencyof decision making and behavioral choice.Thus, it would seem essential to consider the role ofemotions, especially those emerging from dyadicinteractions, as a fundamental source of evolutionaryprogression in our species and many others. Inshort, our introduction of a variant of the groupselection concept is only tangentially related to theclassic concept.In its historical meaning, group selection wasposed and modeled as a possible explanation of whyindividuals in social groupings may behave in a waythat is overtly suggestive of altruism. WYNN-ED-WARDS (1962) postulated that individuals may concedetheir own opportunity to pass on their owngenetic guideline, by opting to contribute time andresources to other members of the group to which itbelonged—a contribution that would facilitatepropagation of the species. Soon after, HAMILTON(1964) argued that seemingly altruistic acts could beexplained by the concept of inclusive fitness. In thisway, individuals would only help out a group memberto the degree that the cost of a specific ‘generous’act was less than the genetic passage to be gained(i.e., the degree of genetic-relatedness should be apredictor of the extent to which an individual willbe altruistic). From this vantage, altruism could beexplained in terms of the genetic success of individuals,and the potential benefits of reciprocity.What remains a moot and often an acrimoniouspoint is whether gregarious animals act altruisticallywhen there is negligible genetic gain at stake. In ourprevious paper, we opined that certain affective/behavioralfunctions could only propagate within aweb of group dynamics. Indeed, if these processesonly occur when individuals are genetically related,they certainly can be reduced to selection at the levelof the individual. However, if some can also operatestrongly between genetically-unrelated individuals(e.g., arising perhaps from pair bonding and othersocial coalitions) then one can imagine, for instance,dyadic selection (a minimalist form of group selection)to be an influential force in evolution. Eitherway, we feel that this process is substantially differentand thus deserving of its own distinction whenEvolution and Cognition ❘ 74 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1