The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology - Konrad Lorenz Institute

Jaak Panksepp and Jules B. PankseppIn sum, although we fully subscribe to the importanceof developmental landscapes in moldinghigher mind/brain capacities, we do not agree withthe full revolutionary fervor of the ‘Ontogeny of Information’critique of genetic influences. The genesare more influential in the construction of organismsthan the classic OYAMA (1985/2000) type ofview seems to accept. We would be surprised if PITCH-FORD would disagree. Surely, we all now agree thatgenes can do nothing without supportive environments.However, a remarkable amount of organismiccompetence naturally unfolds from the genomeand the resulting internal milieu as long as a minimallysupportive external environment is present.There is no comparable robustness that has everbeen demonstrated through variations of prenatalenvironmental factors, at least within a range thatmost reasonable investigators would deem to be normative.However, in pointing out this obvious fact,we do not think that it forces us into the position ofperpetuating the ‘nature versus nurture dichotomy’.As we said in our article, developmental systems theoryis an incredibly important concept, but that inno way should be taken to diminish the importanceof genetic factors. If PITCHFORD does, in fact, believethat external environmental issues are as importantfor the functions of subcortical areas as for corticalones, we disagree with him based on our reading ofa massive amount of available neurobehavioral literature.If he believes that environmental factors aremore important than genetic ones in molding cortico–cognitivefunctions, we would agree with him.PITCHFORD shares an abundance of recent new informationabout cortical issues, but those do not relateclearly to our claim that much of the specializationof the cortex is due to self-organization throughdevelopment whereby functionally dedicated subcorticalsystems interact with a remarkably plasticcerebral mantle. Nothing about the interesting anatomicalissues he summarizes relate to that key issue,and in reading his extensive anatomical coverage,we felt he was creating a verbal smoke-screen (or ‘baitand switch’ as Dan DENNET 1995 might say) ratherthan dealing with the issues we had raised. Thoseanatomical issues are most interesting and important,but they do not unambiguously relate to eitherdevelopmental or intrinsic functional issues. Furthermore,we would note that although PITCHFORDcites work that reports humans have a brain size overthree times the size of a non-human primate of similarsize (RILLING/INSEL 1999), there has been no selectiveincrease of relative frontal lobe size within thehuman species (SEMENDEFERI/DAMASIO 2000). He doesnot cite a single functional study that points clearlytoward a reasonably self-sufficient, evolutionarilydictatedcerebral module that underlies a psychologicalprocess that evolutionary psychologists havepredicted.We are also fascinated by the spindle neuronsfound in the anterior cingulate by NIMCHINSKY andcolleagues (1999) and their potential (though yetundemonstrated) role in socio–vocal communicativeintent (an anterior cingulate function we notedin our target article). We suggest that of the manyspecialized cerebral functions that have been discoveredby neurologists and neuropsychologically-orientedinvestigators during the 20th century, nonehave yet been clarified any further by evolutionarythinking (but see BARKLEY 2001 for some changingcontextualizing trends). In any event, it is more importantfor evolutionary views to generate new neuropsychologicalfindings rather than simply providinga new context for discussing findings discoveredby other disciplines. In this realm, the emerging relateddiscipline of neuro-psychoanalysis seems to befarther along in pursuing such issues (SOLMS 1997;SOLMS/NERSESSIAN 1999; KAPLAN-SOLMS/SOLMS 2000)and we believe such contributions highlight the typeof work that evolutionary psychologists should beginto pursue in earnest.As soon as evolutionary psychologists begin togive us new information about the neuroanatomicallocation, as well as the underlying neuro- and psychodynamicsof their evolved ‘modules’, they shallhave provided biological evidence for what biologicalevolution has created in the human mind/brain. Intheir absence, claims of evolved cortical modularitymust be deemed insubstantial, no matter how manyindividuals have imprinted on the idea. However, weheartily encourage such discoveries and the applicationof the armamentarium of new scientific toolsthat are now available for the study of such problems(TOGA/ MAZZIOTTA 2000). But please remember thatcorrelations do not clearly reflect causations.Although certain human proclivities, such as languageand theory of mind abilities, are surely linkedto our higher cerebral abilities (GALLESE/GOLDMAN1998; BARKLEY 2001), it will be equally important todetermine how those mind/brain functions arelinked to the more ancient systems that we sharewith the other animals. Indeed, we believe that humanfacility for spoken language may be deeplylinked to evolutionarily-derived, emotional/communicativepragmatics exhibited by other mammals.In our cultural evolution, it is certainly possible thathighly-prosodic, sing-song languages emerged longEvolution and Cognition ❘ 66 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1