The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology - Konrad Lorenz Institute

An Evolutionary Perspective on Cognitive Orientationent situations, and also more programs for the sameor similar situations from which one can select theadequate one. Secondly, behavioral programs growin complexity in the sense that they get more hierarchicallyorganized with an increasing number oflevels. This involves not only an increasing numberof units encompassed within the program but alsoconsideration of special conditions, alternatives and‘if then’ eventualities. With time, following differentiationprocesses in complex systems (RIEDL 1997,p152), a differentiation occurs between the levelsthat deal with the overall strategy of action (viz. ‘operationalprogram’) and the levels that deal mainlywith the operational details involved in the specificationsof the enactment, mostly in terms of physiologicalprocesses (viz. ‘program scheme’). The increasedcomplexity of organization enablesactivating not only the program as a whole but partsof programs, or shaping new programs by integratingparts from other programs. At a higher level ofdevelopment, behavioral programs themselves undergofurther evolution in that they are organized,for example in terms of similarity or relevance forspecific situations. Eventually this leads to the thirdimportant development which consists in formingprinciples for the construction of programs. Thisfrees performance to a certain extent from relianceon ready-made programs and introduces the optionof planning, with all the freedom and control it involves.Specific developmental trends. The present sectionis devoted to highlighting diverse evolutionarytrends affecting the phases defined by the CO modelas intervening between input and output. Since theCO model is a cognitive model of motivation, tracingthe evolutionary trends involved in the phasesof the model would highlight more specifically thanbefore the evolutionary development of the cognitiveguidance of motivation.In the first phase, the primary actions would beactivities dependent completely on internal stimuli,if indeed one may consider the internal perturbationsof disturbed homeostasis as stimuli. In the bestcase, they are equivalents or precursors of stimuli.The differentiation between the motivation and actionstarts at this phase. WIMMER (1995) provides amost original and detailed reconstruction of the differentiationin evolutionary perspective. At the lowestlevel we start with the primary action unit, whoseactivity is regulated by internal stimuli. These internalstimuli (the earliest precursor of emotion), reflectboth the inner state of the organism (homeostasis or‘disturbance’) and the outer state (they are the ‘perception’of the environment mediated by the organism’shomeostasis, p43). Moreover, they contain theroots of motivation in the form of ‘expectation’ ofinformation and of response, in the form of rigidmodes of reaction (RIEDL 1980). The evolutionary developmentshows that originally the locomotory activityof kinesis, for example, in taxis behaviors, isrigid, automatically regulated and appears to be undirected.At higher levels of taxis behaviors it is replacedby a type of action which shows the earmarksof being directly determined by the impinging stimulus(LORENZ 1981), reflecting the impact of the organism’sinternal state. This is probably the earliestprecursor of goal-directedness. Notably, it correspondsto ‘intentionality’, that has been identifiedas a basic characteristic of behavior, at least from thelevel of organisms evidencing directed movementsor taxes (DIAMOND 1991; FREEMAN 1999, p41). Themanifestation of intentionality marks the emergenceof motivation as distinct from the action perse. WIMMER (1995, p43) cites in this context the exampleof the behavior of the turbellarian wormswhose movement toward a feeding site depends ontheir internal state: the hungry worm will move towardthe site, whereas a satiated worm will not.Hence, WIMMER concludes that it is the differentiationof the internal state (e.g., hungry, satiated)which leads to the development of more differenttypes of perceptions (sensitivity to different constellationsof stimuli) and of motoric reactions (approachor avoidance reactions). With the developmentof perception, it becomes possible for externalstimuli to initiate action. In terms of the CO theory,it is the motivational disposition which drives developmentof the grasp of reality and of the performancecomponent.Further evolutionary trends that may be relevantin regard to the first phase of the CO theory dependon the development of meaning elaboration andfeedback evaluation. At the lowest level, the inputwhich initiates action has meaning which is minimal(it consists perhaps of only one meaning value)and is couched in actional terms. Hence, we call it‘meaning action’. Its manifestation is precisely inevoking action, say, a reflex. It consists in identifyingthe input as a signal for a specific action, namely, inevoking action and it has no independent existenceoutside action. This applies to stimuli that evoke reflexesor primitive defensive reactions. ‘Releasers’ (orsign stimuli) are at a slightly higher evolutionarylevel insofar as they act as triggers for instincts,which are chains of actions manifesting some degreeEvolution and Cognition ❘ 91 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1