The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology - Konrad Lorenz Institute

A Continuing Critique of Evolutionary PsychologyWe also acknowledge STEGMANN’s concerns withour advocacy of ‘group selection’, for we do believethat pro-social processes must ultimately be instantiatedat an individual (and perhaps dyadic) selectionlevel. We raised this issue partly as an enticementto radical selfish-gene selectionists, assumingthey are still out there, rather than from any deepconviction that group selection, as traditionally understood,is a robust vector in animal evolution (see“Group Selection” section below)Our advocacy is based on the recognition that inthe evolution of social processes, brain mechanismsmay have emerged which only operate optimallywithin certain social contexts and some may be sufficientlygeneral that they may provide a competitiveedge even in the context of outright altruisticbehaviors. For instance, since our social bondingmechanisms appear to be designed in such a way asto be based more on learning than intrinsic kin-recognition,it is easy to envision why humans mayadopt the children of strangers, even though that isnot to their direct genetic advantage. It may simplybe to their emotional advantage, even though itmay be easy to theoretically (and in our estimationarbitrarily) postulate that it may provide some potentialgenetic advantage because of the massivelyshared genetic heritage that all humans share. Inany event, we believe that affective feelings are themain psychological currency which guides the behaviorof individuals in genetically advantageous(i.e., survival and reproduction promoting) directions.We look forward to reading STEGMANN’s morecomprehensive description of his position, and wewill be especially interested in seeing how his ideasmight be subjected to empirical tests. Without clearpredictions, all views, no matter how holistically attractivethey may seem at semantic levels, will remainscientifically sterile. We trust that STEGMANNhas taken his interesting analysis to the predictivelevel. Explanation and synthesis without the precisionof new predictions can all too easily appeal toour intellectual–aesthetic senses while not contributingmuch to the rigor of our analytical endeavors.Indeed, that is one of the ‘siren-song’ appeals of EvolutionaryPsychology—it provides such a simple andoutwardly credible conceptual umbrella, that oftenthe reductionistic strategies we must develop to scientificallyunderstand the true nature of the underlyingprocesses become of secondary importance.The goal of our article was largely to bring variousneglected scientific issues to the foreground of discussion.Russel Gardner:A Neuropsychiatric PerspectiveIn his commentary, GARDNER highlights the desperateneed to fully integrate perspectives for the studyof matters concerning the brain and mind. Typicallythey are still considered separately, and one of themajor challenges he poses is to build bridges thatlink those disparate realms in ways that are subjectto scientific evaluation. Of course, that has been themain goal of affective neuroscience (PANKSEPP1998a). Indeed, the cardinal scientific motivation ofthe senior author has been to develop credible scientificstructures that may help highlight the deepnature of psychiatric/emotional disorders in thehuman species. This project, at its outset, recognizedthat there seems to be no other robust scientific pathto understanding the underlying emotional andmotivational dynamics of the human brain thanthrough the detailed analysis of homologous processesin related animals. The details of the humanbrain are simply too inaccessible, but faith in theexistence of deep evolutionary homologies hasalready paid off handsomely in biological psychiatry(CHARNEY/NESTLER/BUNNEY 1999), and it will continueto do so at an ever increasing pace as investigatorslearn how to effectively modulate neuropeptidesystems (PANKSEPP 1993, 1998).The supposition that we can understand the essentialoutlines of our own evolved emotional processesby studying the brains of other animals has not traditionallybeen well received by the psychologicalcommunity. For many, it remains too much of a theoreticalleap to believe that other animals experienceemotions. However, on the basis of evolutionary considerationsas well as massive anatomical and neurochemicalhomologies, this possibility is now a solidhypothesis. It is also one that can now be experimentallytested because the neurochemical discoveries inother animals can lead to pharmacological interventionsthat generate predictions and can be evaluatedin humans. For instance, the abundant work on corticotrophin-releasingfactor implicating it in anxietydisorders and depression, has led to concordant findingsin humans (NESTLER 1998). There are many otherexamples (CHARNEY et al. 1999).GARDNER also provides a didactic service by highlightingthe history of such approaches in the psychiatriccommunity, noting how ‘selective allegiances’among powerful academic circles have probably retardedthe bridging work that needs to be done. Theemergence of evolutionary psychiatry, partly underthe umbrella of the Across-Species Comparisons andEvolution and Cognition ❘ 61 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1